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ABSTRACT
The following study has taken a systems approach to investigate
organisational learning within the University of Natal, Durban (UND), The
research used the Banner system implementation project as the case study
for the investigation.
In 1993, the University of Natal made a decision to purchase the Banner
Student Information System. The system was implemented over an eighteen-
month period resulting in the Banner system going "live" for registration of
students in 1995. A decision was taken in 1997/8 to discontinue implementing
upgrade packages for the Banner system, indicating a move away from the
system within two to three years of implementation.
This document begins with a review of current literature with regard to
systems thinking, organisational learning and change management. This
review serves to underpin the research methodology implemented within the
research process.
The research methodology, known as learning histories, is explained, and a
description of the research process is provided. The core of the research
process involved open-ended reflective interviews aimed at incorporating the
different perspectives of the majority of stakeholders involved in the system
implementation. In addition to this, an analysis was conducted on a selection
of Banner-related documents. The scope of the research was limited and
would best be described as a pilot study.
Those interviewed included members of the university executive committee,
Banner office personnel, faculty officers, deans, administrative personnel,
management information personnel and the project manager for the
implementation.
The major findings of the research process were:
1. The decision to purchase the Banner student information system was
problematic.
2. The wider system that was created to maintain Banner was complex and
generated a large degree of dependency on the Banner office.
3. The Banner office was a powerful gatekeeper of information within the
system whose identity was wrapped up in a product and not a function.
4. The training system implemented was flawed and did not equip key users
with a global understanding of the functionality of the system.
5. The university was unclear about what information it wanted out of the
system and who was to have access to this information.
6. The university used Banner almost entirely as a student administration
system and management information was not well developed within the
Banner system.
The following areas were highlighted as important for the university with
regards to organisational learning and the case study:
1. Decision support systems.
2. The role of technology within the university.
3. A systems approach to understanding the context of the university.
4. The learning systems operating within the university.
5. Managing change.
The limited scope of the research presents its own problems for drawing any
firm conclusions. The research process has rather highlighted new areas for
research. These include:
1. The relationship between workplace procedures and new technology.
2. The role of information technology and information systems in decision
support and management support.
3. Change management processes within larger project-based
implementations.
4. Decision making within higher education institutions.
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In order to present to the reader a more contextual understanding of this
document, I have decided to include a preface. In doing so, I will be
presenting some of the more personal reasons for why this research was
chosen and provide the reader with a better understanding of the process that
lead to those choices.
Why a Systems Approach?
Systems thinking has become an increasingly important aspect of my life over
the past two years. I am currently involved in the field of Adult Basic Education
and my first taste of systems thinking came about due to the increasing
interest in the concept of Organisational Learning in the organisation that
employees me. The work of Senge (1990) led to the discovery of Argyris and
Schon (1978) and from there to the wider systems thinking field and literature.
Systems thinking has formed the basis of the course of study within which this
project has been undertaken and, much more personally, I could say, has
invaded my whole being and thought processes. At first I experienced great
resistance to thinking in this manner but as I read further into the philosophy
of systems thinking, I came to realise the inherent usefulness of viewing the
world as a set of interrelated systems.
One of the consequences of my personal evolvement in systems thinking was
that it freed me from the intensely reductionist thinking that I had been
schooled in up until this point. Not to say that this type of thinking is not
necessary, but rather that my worldview has expanded to allow this other,
more holistic framework to be developed.
I understand systems thinking as a useful way of viewing the world and the
problem situations we so often find ourselves in. It has helped me to develop
a more inclusive, rather than my previously held exclusive, framework of
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investigation. Although just a theory and a way of viewing the world, systems
thinking has helped me to investigate problems on a deeper level. A systems
approach looks to interrelationships, systems within systems, tacit
assumptions, trends and patterns, and emergence to understanding a
problem.
With this being the case, a systems approach is a very useful tool for the
investigation into the area of systems implementation. I believe that a systems
approach lends itself very well to dealing with complexity and
interrelationships. The university case study certainly presented itself, at the
onset, as a system of complexity and diversity with a great deal of
interconnectedness.
The research process utilises a specific systems approach called A Learning
History. This methodology will be further explained in a separate chapter later
in the document.
Why Information Systems?
The major reason for choosing the area of information systems was a
personal, career-related desire to enter into the IT field and specifically into
systems implementation. I have not worked in the field and thus saw this as
an opportunity to gain some exposure into the field and discover some of the
complexities and problematic areas that exist within this area.
In addition to this information systems are becoming a centrally important
aspect of modern day, computerised organisations. They have the potential to
play an extremely important role in the organisation. On the other hand, if the
system does not satisfy the requirements of the organisation and the users, it
has the potential to become an extremely costly and frustrating investment in
technology that serves little purpose.
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CHAPTER ONE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM AND
PROBLEM CONTEXT
1.1 Introduction
I want to begin by making explicit the overarching emphasis that guided the
research process. My intention was to investigate the problem context with a
particular emphasis on organisational learning. Although the case study used
in the research was an information systems implementation, it simply provided
a context within which to investigate organisational learning.
Organisational Learning is a concept that has been discussed and analysed to
a large degree within the fairly recent past. Peter Senge (1990,1994) has
often been attributed to popularising the concept. Within his book, The Fifth
Disciple (1990), Senge argues that Organisational Learning is grounded in
five principles or as he states, 'disciplines'.
Other noted authors include: Argyris (1993, 1994), Garratt (1987), de Geus
(1997), Kleiner (1996), Donald Schon (1987), Van Der Heijden (1996) and
Pierre Wack (HBR Sept-Oct 1985). Some further reading lead me to believe
that the writings of Bohm (1996), Kolb (1984), Piaget (1969) and Churchman
(1968, 1971, 1979) are foundational to the writings mentioned above. This list
is by no means complete, but simply gives reference to some of the noted
authors within this area.
From the reading completed, what begins to emerge is that organisational
learning, as a field or area of study, is extremely diverse. Different authors
have presented their views and begun to develop theories from different
perspectives, which seems to have evolved more out of their experiences
than anywhere else. This is not to say that this is a good or bad thing, but
simply an observation made. This observation could, and should be, an area




Information Technology (IT) and more specifically Information Systems (IS)
has become a critically important aspect of most organisations within the
computerised world. Within the last eight years, this field has had to deal with
rapid development and expansion.
Marais1 (2000) recent article is useful at this point to highlight this expansion
and the impact it is having. The article gives reference to Castells' trilogy, "The
Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture". Castells (in Marais 2000)
mentions that the new networked economy has three basic features. For our
purposes, the first feature is of most importance, "Productivity and
competitiveness depend on information technologies and the building of
knowledge" (p. 62).
In a world of growing interconnectedness and hence increasing complexity,
decisions need to be taken on the basis of valid, authentic and useful
information. In theory, this is what an information system is meant to provide.
One of the underlying principles, possibly the central principle, with regard to
the design and development of information systems is that they must satisfy
the needs and requirements of the organisation (Burch & Grudnitski, 1989;
Eason, 1988; Lucas, 1986; Senn, 1982).
Although the focus is on organisational learning and not, per say, information
systems implementation, I think it would be useful to give a brief overview of
some general criteria for a systems implementation of this nature. This is by
no means a detailed review of the literature, but rather a presentation of the
"basics" to enable greater insight into the problem context.
One of the clearer reviews of this process was found in Eason (1988), where
he lists a six-stage process for systems specification:
" 1. Analysis of Organisational Needs and Opportunities. In this stage the
objective is to undertake a form of analysis which will identify the directions
15
the organisation should be taking in a way which will facilitate the identification
of valuable roles for information technology to play.
2. The Specification of Options. If the overall direction has been established,
technological and other options can be matched to the organisational
requirements in order to produce broad conceptual proposals for potential
socio-technical systems.
3. /Assess Consequences of Options. This is the analysis by role playing
techniques of the direct and indirect consequences of proposed socio-
technical systems and their evaluation from the viewpoints of different groups
of staff.
4. The Analysis of User/ Task Requirements for the Proposed Socio-technical
System. Within the broad conceptual specification that has been agreed upon
it is necessary to detail the requirements of the users and their tasks for the
social and technical systems to be designed.
5. The Specification of a Prototype System. The creation of a version of the
proposed system(including both its technical and social elements) for the
purpose of evaluation and refinement of the specification.
6. The Evaluation of the Prototype System. The systematic analysis, perhaps
through trial usage, of the prototype system in order that users can have
realistic experience upon which to base their assessments and to revise their
requirement specification." (p.85).
Although the above description is a clear and concise account of the process,
it does not contain anything vastly different from the rest of the literature
reviewed. Most of the literature starts with identifying organisational goals and
objectives and seeing how information systems could be utilised to facilitate
the meeting of these goals. From here the process moves to identifying user
requirements and then begins to enter into the detailed stage of the systems
development lifecycle.
Burch and Grudnitski (1989) talk about strategic information systems planning
(SIPS). This contains basically three stages: Establishing information systems
goals, eliciting and prioritizing information system project requests and finally
assessing information systems resources and capacity.
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Finally, Lucas (1986) presents a number of practical suggestions, "...which
are intended to produce high levels of systems use and successful
implementation.
1. Urge the formation of a steering committee of users and information
services department staff members to determine priorities for the
development of new applications.
2. Encourage training sessions for the information services department staff
to help its members adopt a role as catalyst in the development process.
3. Insist that a user be placed in charge of the design team for a new system,
4. Provide sufficient resources so that staff can spend time on systems
design.
5. Work personally (senior management) with a design team to show interest
and commitment.
6. See that decisions and not just data flows are considered in systems
design.
7. Ask probing questions to see if designers have considered the multiple
roles of information for the organisation and different decision makers.
8. Review all proposed output from a new system, be selective, and avoid
information overload.
9. Examine the user interface with the system; see that users have
experimented with the input and output and find it acceptable.
10. Plan for implementation for subordinates and colleagues, consider
different personal and situational factors, and prepare for changes.
11. Ensure that adequate resources have been devoted to training and user
documentation "(p.77-78).
It should also be noted that implementation, as used here, should be
understood in its broadest sense. This would encompass the whole process
from the initial decisions to purchase a new system, right through all aspects
of installation, training, maintenance and support.
Due to the recognition that systems implementation is an area of complexity
and, in many cases difficult, this study explores the process. This has been
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possible through the use of a case study and research process at the
University of Natal, Durban Campus, Durban, South Africa.
The research, which uses a systems approach and more specifically a
learning history approach, was conducted in order to investigate and hopefully
shed some light on the following question:
From Promise to Practice: Information Systems Implementation
Why the Gap?
This overarching question includes a number of research themes that have




♦ Actual Use of the System compared to full Capability
♦ Change Management
I would argue that each of these research themes played an important role
within the system under investigation and the particular case study used. As
this dissertation is focusing on organisational learning, the first theme is a
given.
As the research will show, decision making played a key role in the case study
under investigation. The research will show that some of the decisions taken
within the Banner System had wide ranging implications for the information
system and it's use. As such an investigation into decision making and the
decision making context is worthwhile with regard to what the organisation
can learn.
The last three themes are related and as such I will mention then together.
The Banner system implementation was a project-based implementation that
utilised an external project manager model. With this being the case, an
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investigation into the manner in which the project was managed, the priorities
for the project and the generally running of the project will hopefully shed
some light on the whole Banner System Implementation.
In addition to the implementation being project-based, it also is a massive
change program. The implementation of a new system, which was to have a
sizable effect on the workplace operating systems, on a campus-wide basis,
involves a large amount of people changing. The issues of change
management play an important role (Kotter, 1996) when undertaking a
change initiative of this size and nature.
Linked to the change management issues is that of the actual verses potential
use of the Banner system. How well a system is implemented and how well
the change aspects are managed is going to have some affect on the extent
to which the system is accepted and used to its fullest capability. With this is
mind, I wanted to investigate just how well the Banner system implementation
and changeover was managed and to what extent the system was used in
relation to its full potential.
1.3 The Case Study
In March 1993 the University of Natal signed contracts to purchase the
Banner Student and Financial Aid Systems. The Banner system was
purchased to replace the existing Student Information Management System
(SIMS).
On the basis of an initial presentation on campus in late 1992 by Systems and
Computer Technology Corp. (SCT), the American developer of Banner, a
more detailed investigation of the system was commissioned. Following on
from this, in February 1993, John Lambert from SCT visited the university and
made a number of demonstrations. As part of the investigation process, a
team of three people was sent to the United States to visit other higher
education institutions that were using Banner. At the same time the university
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was in contact with Flinders University in Australia who were the pioneers of
Banner in Australia.
In late March 1993, the university executive, on the recommendation of the
SIMS action group, took a decision to purchase Banner. The promise, with
regards to the Banner system, was that it was a fully automated, fully
integrated tertiary student information system. Banner was capable of
handling the universities full management information requirements, with
regard to students and student affairs, in addition to being a fully
administrative student information system.
The Banner system was planned to be implemented over a 16-month period
and be 'on-line' for registration in 1995. An external project manager was
employed to supervise the process.
About 1997/1998, a decision was taken to stop upgrading Banner. In essence,
it seems that this decision to stop upgrading Banner was really a decision to
move away from Banner.
From this brief overview, one can see that Banner was really only utilised fully
for two or three years before the decision was taken to move away from
Banner. This posed a very real case scenario that something had not worked
as well as expected. A student information system of this size, covering all
campuses of the University of Natal, and cost would have had a expected
lifetime of more than two to three years.
As a result of this initial investigation of the research context, I decided that
the university would be a suitable case study for the purpose of the research
emphasis described above.
1.4 Scope of the Study
The scope of the study is a vital aspect of the research. It must be stated at
this stage that the research undertaken can only be classified as a pilot study.
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The size, cost and time involved in a full-scale learning history were beyond
the limits of this study and of one researcher. This issue will be discussed
further in the learning history chapter.
The scale of the research was limited to what was feasible in the time allowed
and the limited resources available. As a result although the University of
Natal is comprised of a number of campuses, the other main one being at
Pietermaritzburg, the scope of the study has been limited to the Durban
campus. I have attempted to include a full range of perspectives and role
players that, in my understanding of the implementation process, covers
the key stakeholders.
As mentioned above, I saw the study as a pilot. It is intended to shed some
light on the implementation process and for the university organisation to learn
from the lessons that emerge. I do not claim that this is the total picture. I
acknowledge that, depending on whom one interviewed, the possibility exists
for a completely different learning history to be developed. But, in saying this,
what I present within this document is the understanding and the perspectives
of the people I interviewed as well as my own understanding of the situation
and more importantly, what can be learnt from this process.
In conclusion, I am saying that different stories of the past exist. This is a
central premise of the learning history approach, in that it tries to tie all these
perspectives together and present the richest picture of the process. In
saying that, the one that I present here should be acknowledged as valid. It is
an accurate reflection of the people I interviewed who were involved in this
process. The crux of the matter is that it is just one of many possible stories of
the process.
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CHAPTER TWO: SYSTEMS THINKING
2.1 Introduction
As an introduction, I believe that it is necessary to lay a foundation that will
form the theoretical framework that will underpin the rest of the document. It
will also have the dual purpose of informing the reader of the perspective and
understanding that I use as a point of departure. I have chosen to highlight
three areas. These are Systems Thinking, Organisational Learning and
Change.
The reason for highlighting is relatively simple. All three areas are, in my
opinion, aspects that have had a major influence on the development of the
methodology used in my research. With this being the case, there is a need to
look at, and understand, the development of thinking within these distinct, but
interrelated, domains
A 'Learning History' has been described as an effective method of uncovering
and presenting to the wider organisational audience the learning that has
taken place through, and as a result of, a change initiative (Kleiner & Roth,
1996). With this in mind, the concept of organisational learning is of central
importance to any such investigation.
2.2 Systems Thinking
Ackoff (1997) presents some useful foundational concepts with regard to the
development of systems thinking. One of the first points made is that our
worldview or "Weltanschauung" is developed by what he terms "osmosis"
(p.1). We acquire it via the very processes of growing up in the family, the
environment and the culture of which we are a part. As such, most people are
unaware that this framework for interpreting the world actually exists.
Ackoff (1997) would argue, and personal experience would testify to this, that
most people do not realise that they interpret the world through a set of
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assumptions. In fact most people believe that the way they interpret the world
is the 'truth' and that the world before them is made of the simple facts that
stand before them as they would stand before anyone. With this
understanding, we can begin to see why there is so much conflict in our time.
When people come into conflict, if there is no realisation of these assumptions
then the idea of 'I'm right and therefore you have to be wrong' is an easy trap
to fall into. It is also a very easy and comfortable trap to fall into.
When I am right and you are wrong, there is only black and white, no difficult
grey areas of intense complexity exist. This thinking, which underpins the
reductionist / scientific paradigm, has a number of beliefs attached to it. Ackoff
(1997) highlights three of them:
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1. The universe is completely understandable.
2. Analysis is inquiry.
3. Everything can be explained by cause and effect" (p.3).
These three concepts really hold the heart of what Ackoff calls the "machine
age" (1997). He states that if you believe that the universe is completely
understandable, then you should be able to analyse (explained as breaking
the whole into its component parts) it and whatever you find in your analysis
should have a cause and effect explanation. Ackoff (1997) then quotes the
following:
"In physics, for example, scientists decided that all physical objects
could be broken down into indivisible particles of matter called
atoms. The atomic theory is thus a reductionist theory of nature. In
chemistry, the indivisible units were the elements, listed on the
Periodic Table. In biology, the indivisible unit was the cell.
Reductionist theory stretched even into linguistics, one of the most
modern fields of scientific study, where it is believed that all
languages can be reduced to an element of sound called a
phoneme.
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In a sense, then, science became a crusade in search of the
simplest element in every discipline of study, for post-Renaissance
thinkers believed that human beings could understand the universe
only by first comprehending the elements of which it was
composed" (p.3).
The above quote shows the extent that the scientific paradigm has so
engulfed our thinking and endeavours to discover meaning. What it also
shows is that this type of analysis has brought about some important
discoveries and added a great deal to the advancement of human kind to the
place where it is today.
Another interesting point that Ackoff (1997) raises with regard to cause and
effect thinking and for our discussion on the development of systems thinking,
is that "Environmental factors are excluded as causal explanations for
anything" (p.4). This point highlights and underpins the, "I am right you are
wrong" standpoint. This statement implies that everything has been reduced
to its component parts, the only two things that exist is you and me (no
environmental impact) and if we analyse this enough we can find the answer.
As we shall see shortly, the idea of environmental impact and 'nested
systems' is of great importance to the concept of systems thinking.
One of the problems that emerged and, as Khun (1970) would argue, brings
about the "scientific revolution" is that a single paradigm, by its very nature of
being limited, is unable to answer all questions posed to it. In most cases,
when the paradigm has taken full hold of people's thinking, these
unanswerable questions or irreconcilable results and data are simply
dismissed. The paradigm acts as a filter and simply filters out that which does
not fit within the current framework.
The challenge comes when, generally, new people who are not fully
indoctrinated in the paradigm, begin to work on the fringes with data that
doesn't fit and ask those unanswerable questions. It is at this point that a new
paradigm may begin to emerge.
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It is at this point that people began to recognise that reductionism may not
answer all the questions. Scientists today have even gone further with the
breaking up of the atom, that which we thought was the smallest element of
matter, but does this provide the answer to some of the sticky, complex and
inherently problematic situations that are so prevalent in today's society?
With the help of Ackoff (1997), I have just presented a brief history of the
context that helped to bring about a challenge to the reductionist paradigm.
This challenge allowed a new paradigm called the systems approach to
emerge.
One of the first issues that became apparent upon investigation of systems
thinking and systems in general is the crucial component of perception.
Reference is made to this concept via Ackoff (1997) in our discussion above.
A system seems to be never more than the observer's perception of the
situation being observed. Hence two people can be observing the same
situation but see two different situations. Obviously the situations are not
different. What is different is the way they are viewed or perceived. The one
overwhelming factor that influences the perception of an observer is his or her
worldview. The German word, "Weltanschauung", seems to reoccur
throughout the literature (Ackoff, 1997, Checkland 1981, Waring 1996) with
regard to the concept of worldview.
What is also clear is that the term 'system1 used today is very different from
the term system used by systems thinkers who agreed that a broadly agreed
upon set of components make up a system.
With this in mind, and with reference to Ackoffs (1997) concept of osmosis
with regard to the acquisition of our worldviews, I would like to shift focus
briefly to look at the relationship between worldview and thought. Bohm
(1996) is an interesting source of insight for this discussion. If, as Ackoff
(1997) argues, our worldview is developed over time almost as a process of
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socialisation, then where does thought fit into this process? I would argue that
thought is constrained to those areas which the worldview allows thought on.
Bohm (1996) states, "Thought defends its basic assumptions against
evidence that they may be wrong ... Most of our basic assumptions come
from our society, including all our assumptions about how society works,
about what sort of person we are supposed to be, and about relationships,
institutions and so on" (p. 11). This shows some alignment in the thinking of
Ackoff and Bohm. Both say that our worldview, which basically comprises our
assumptions about how the world works, is invested into us through our
society. What Bohm (1996) adds is that it is thought that defends these basic
assumptions.
What is interesting is that according to the ideas of Ackoff (1997) and Bohm
(1996), people could be locked in a double bind. Ackoff (1997) states that
people are generally not aware of the assumptions that are held. These
assumptions could be said to be tacit knowledge. In addition, Bohm (1996)
argues that, "Our thought, too, is a process, and it requires attention,
otherwise it's going to go wrong" (p.9). Taking this point further Bohm (1996)
states that,".... but there is a deeper root, which is that thought is very active,
but the process of thought thinks that it is doing nothing - that it is just telling
you the way things are...The point is: thought produces results, but thought
says it didn't do it. And this is a problem" (p. 10).
So we can deduce that the average person is ploughing through life probably
not knowing about the tacitly held assumptions that make it possible for
him/her to interpret the world. On top of that is the process of thought, which
will defend these assumptions as if they are the core of "truth" but, at the very
same time, tell you that this is just the way things are.
This begins to link very closely with Argyris and Schon's (1978) concept of
limited learning systems. One of the core concepts of this is the "cover-up".
People tend to cover-up any aspects of conflict and then cover-up the cover-
up. In a sense, thought is covering up our basic assumptions by calling them
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the truth and then covering up the cover-up by telling us that this is just the
way the world is, plain and simple. Within this learning system, it is very
difficult, so Argyris and Schon (1978) argue, to uncover these assumptions as
they are hidden behind the many walls of cover-up.
So, going back to our original question of the relationship between thought
and worldview, I think that it is reasonable to confirm that thought is limited to
our worldview, but, to add on my new personal discovery, thought can limit the
expanding of our worldview. This happens via thought's cover-up process, as
discussed above. To be able to begin to change our worldviews, we have to
firstly realise that they are our basic assumptions, but thought is preventing us
from doing this by telling us that it is not defending anything but that this is
simply "the way it is". So, I would therefore argue that people might have
difficulty recognising that thought is active and in addition to this, the double
cover-up, that it is defending a set of basic assumptions.
To conclude, Churchman (1979) states, "We ought to ask ourselves at the
very outset how to think about a large system, and our manner of thinking will
dictate how we will describe the system ...The systems approach will have to
disturb typical mental processes and suggest some radical approaches to
thinking. It may in fact already be radical for somebody to think first of all
about the overall objective and then to begin to describe the system in terms






Figure 1: The Relationship between Thought and Worldview
2.2.1 What is a System?
While there seems to be some general consensus around the concept of a
system, there are still a variety of so-called definitions. For example, Wilson
(1984) states, "a system is a structured set of objectives and/or attributes
together with the relationships between them" (p.20) or Flood and Carson
(1988), "an assembly of elements related in an organised whole" (p.7). Again
Checkland (1981), " the idea of a set of elements connected together which
form a whole, this showing properties which are properties of the whole, rather
than properties of its component parts" (p.3). In a slightly more general
definition, Flood and Jackson (1998) claim, "a system is used not to refer to
things in the world but to a particular way of organising our thoughts about the
world" (p. 2).
What emerges is an interest in the whole, rather than its parts and not just the
whole but the relationships between the parts that make up the whole.
Bertalanffy (1968) in his General Systems Theory first suggested this concept
of the whole rather than the parts.
Whereas the above ensemble of definitions can help to bring about a general
understanding of the concept of a 'system', a more detailed elaboration is
required if it is to be of any use in practical terms. With this in mind, I borrow
from Waring (1996) in helping to bring about this needed clarity:
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• A component is affected by its inclusion in the system.
• Components are perceived to be related in hierarchical
structures.
• There are means for control and communication, which
promote system survival.
• The system has emergent properties, some of which are
difficult to predict.
• The system has a boundary.
• Outside the boundary is a system environment, which affects
the system
Although the above components are helpful in making some practical use out
of the concept 'system1, they are not complete. Some additions are needed to
bring together some other key aspects that are in the systems literature.
2.2.2 Events, Patterns and Structure
Events, patterns and structure can be seen as differing levels of perception
within a system. An analogy may help in explaining this concept. If one looks
at the life of a tree, we can begin to visualise the concepts of events, patterns
and structure. If we take events to be the growth of leaves on the branches,
patterns, the 'life and death' cycle that a tree goes through each year, and
structure, as the internal make up of the tree.
By viewing the tree only from the perspective of the leaves (events) of the
tree, we can only discover and understand a limited amount about the tree. By
looking at the 'life and death' cycle (patterns) of each year of the tree's life we
can understand a little more. But by understanding the internal make up of the
tree, we begin to see the factors and relationships that are driving the patterns
and events. Just as we cannot see the internal makeup of the tree (this is
stretching the analogy) we often cannot see the structures that are driving the
patterns and events of the systems we observe. The reason being that the
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structure is to be found in the interrelationships of the components and not the
components themselves, and as such are often 'invisible'.
2.2.3 'Emergence and Hierarchy' and 'Communication and Control'
Although the terms above are embedded in the list of components taken from
Waring (1996), some writers express them as critical pairs of ideas. For
example Checkland (1981) states that, "...systems thinking is founded upon
two pairs of ideas, those of emergence and hierarchy and communication and
control." (p.75) For this reason, I felt it important to mention them in a category
of their own.
Systems thinking has attempted over the years to deal with the problematic
issues of complexity and organisation of complexity. In its investigations into
complexity, as well as the influence of the shift away from reductionist
thinking, the concepts of emergence and hierarchy have appeared. In the
most basic of terms, emergence is a concept that recognises the fact that
there are properties that 'emerge' at a system level that do not exist or cannot
be attributed to the isolated components. This links closely to the idea that the
whole is greater than the sum of its parts. It states that complexity, at certain
levels and in certain situations, cannot be reduced into smaller and smaller
parts, because in doing so, the system loses some of these emergent
properties from higher levels.
This notion of 'higher levels' brings us to that of hierarchy. Hierarchy refers to
the concept of organisation at different levels of a system. Bertalanffy's (1968)
General Systems Theory postulates that there are systems everywhere and
that all systems are a part of a bigger system. Although Bertalanffy's (1968)
generalised view can be left wanting due to its lack of specific content, it
presupposes an idea of hierarchy.
The way Checkland (1981) describes hierarchy and emergence is very useful
at this point:
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"It is the concept of organized complexity which became the subject
matter of the new discipline 'systems'; and the general model of
organised complexity is that there exists a hierarchy of level of
organisation, each more complex than the one below, a level being
characterised by emergent properties which do not exist at the
lower level. Indeed, more than the fact that they 'do not exist' at the
lower level, emergent properties are meaningless in the language
appropriate to the lower level" (p.78).
Hierarchy focuses on the differences between the levels of complexity and
the relationships that exist between these levels.
The other pair of ideas is that of communication and control. In a system that
has different levels of complexity and can be impacted upon by its
environment, there seems to be a certain amount of information that is
communicated for the purposes of control. Control can be understood in terms
of regulation.
These terms bring into play the field known as cybernetics. Cybernetics, which
began to develop in the form we currently know it, emerged in the 1940's. One
of the central features of cybernetics is 'feedback'. It is within this concept that
control and 'self-regulation' come into play. Fritjof Capra (1996) captures the
essence of what is meant by the concept of communication and control:
"The crucial difference is embodied in Norbet Wiener's concept of
feedback and is expressed in the very meaning of 'cybernetics'. A
feedback loop is a circular arrangement of causally connected
elements, in which an initial cause propagates around the link of
the loop, so that each element has an effect on the next, until the
last 'feedback' the effect into the first element of the cycle. The
consequence of this arrangement is that the first link ('input') is
affected by the last ('output'), which results in self-regulation of the
entire system, as the initial effect is modified each time it travels
around the cycle" (p.56).
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Cannon (in Capra, 1996) investigated the above concept of information flow
(communication) and control (regulation) during the 1920's, which resulted in
his concept of homeostasis. Again Capra (1996) presents Cannon's (1932)
clear understanding of this concept: "the self-regulatory mechanism that
allows organisms to maintain themselves in a state of dynamic balance with
their variables fluctuating between tolerance limits" (p.42).
Interestingly, there are considerable similarities between Capra's (1996)
'Points of Instability', where dramatic and unpredictable events took place;
Kuhn's (1970) Paradigm Shifts; and the current concept of emergence in
systems thinking. Capra (1996) suggests that as the elements of systems
interact, resulting in communication and feedback, 'points of instability' arise,
at which time a new 'order' emerges. He makes this classification for 'open
systems far from equilibrium', which means a system that operates in a
dynamic state that does not reach equilibrium. Kuhn (1970) suggests that the
scientific world operates within a currently agreed paradigm that 'constrains'
scientists to a certain viewpoint. As this current paradigm begins to 'not'
answer some of the questions of science, a stage arises (which could be
paralleled to Capra's 'point of instability') at which the 'scientific revolution'
occurs and a new state of 'order' emerges in the form of a newly accepted
paradigm.
In the same fashion, the concept of emergence and hierarchy come into play.
As the elements interact, the information and control begins to flow and
properties of this level of the system begin to emerge. Although this could be
seen as stretching the point, it was useful in drawing together a fuller
understanding of these concepts.
2.2.4 The Influence of Metaphors and Models of Organisation on
Systems Thinking
From the works of Flood and Jackson (1998) and Morgan (1986), the
concepts of Metaphor and Models of organisation have been shown as key
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components in looking at problem situations and attempted resolution. Flood
and Jackson (1998) outline metaphors in the following passage;
"We have our general conception of 'system' in place, broadly in
terms of complex networks. To this must be added content in the
form of different 'flavourings'. This will provide the systemic
metaphors which we shall employ as filters for looking at problem
situations" (p. 7).
The use of metaphor is thus concealed in the 'viewing' of a certain situation,
or an organisation from a certain standpoint. Morgan (1986) brings some
clarity to this concept:
"... our theories about explanations of organisational life are based
on metaphors that lead us to see and understand organizations in
distinctive yet partial ways. ... for the use of metaphor implies a way
of thinking and a way of seeing that pervade how we understand
our world generally" (p. 12).
The above quote seems to liken metaphor and the concept of
'Weltanschauung' in some respect. The 'world view' that we have would
inform which metaphor we use to 'see' a situation. The way Morgan speaks
seems to suggest that the use of metaphor is at a level below our conscious
thoughts, that is, unless we have been alerted to the concept of metaphor.
The usefulness of metaphor comes into play when we are able to suspend an
'ingrained' way of 'seeing' things and begin to use a new 'lens' that brings to
light new aspects, not formerly highlighted by the ingrained metaphor. This
can then help to bring about a more informed understanding of the problem
situation and hence progression towards a viable resolution.
Although Morgan (1986) goes into more detail, Flood and Jackson (1998)
propose five metaphors for viewing organisations. They are:
• Machine metaphor, or 'closed system' view
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• Organic metaphor, or 'open system1 view
• Neurocybernetic metaphor, or 'viable system' view
• Cultural metaphor
• Political metaphor" (p.7).
It is important to include this section within the systems thinking component as
the concept of organisational metaphor, I would argue, is going to play a key
role in the understanding presented by the research participants of the
problem situation. As we have been reading over the past few pages, the way
a person views a system has a great deal to do with the way they
conceptualise the problem situation.
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CHAPTER THREE: ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING
For the purpose of this paper, I will be using Argyris and Schon's (1978)
theory of organisational learning as a basis. This is not to say that I have not
consulted widely within the current literature, but rather that I believe it to be
one of the more robust models, which has the potential to be applied within a
wide range of contexts. Argyris (1993), in particular, has done an extensive
amount of work within the different facets of organisational learning, including
organisational defensive routines, skilled incompetence and investigating how
to overcome organisational defensiveness.
Argyris and Schon (1978, 1996) are two of the better known writers that have
influenced the field of organisational learning. Their seminal text,
"Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective" (1978) has formed,
I believe, the basis of much of their later work. It lays down the foundational
issues, according to the two writers, of what makes up a learning organisation
and places a heavy emphasis on the barriers to becoming a learning
organisation.
The authors mention that one of their major concerns when doing research for
the book was, "especially directed to learning about interpersonal interaction"
(Argyris & Schon, 1978, p. 10). From what I understand, the two authors have
been heavily influenced by psychology and, in fact, Argyris is a psychologist,
albeit an organisational psychologist. It is not difficult to see then that their
focus for investigation is around personal interaction. This is carried through in
most of their work, and forms the basis of their arguments around becoming a
learning organisation.
3.1 Start with a Question
Argyris and Schon (1978) begin their inquiry into organisational learning by
posing a question, "What is an Organisation that it may learn?" (p.8). Being
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such a useful question, it seemed to make sense to start our inquiry with this
question also.
The question seemed to arise out of a concern that some clarity needed to be
brought about in terms of what organisational learning is meant to be. This
concern, from my understanding, emerged out of a context where learning is
often assigned to a group within an organisation. This group becomes a
specialist, elite group that is tasked with 'learning' for everyone else. A
number of questions arise from this model. One of the most obvious ones is:
Does the fact that this group or department learns mean that the organisation
learns? Following on from that is the crucial question: What are the
components that make up organisational learning? and finally, What
distinguishes organisational learning from individual learning?. Argyris and
Schon (1978) put it this way:
"There is something paradoxical here. Organizations are not
merely collections of individuals, yet there is no organization
without such collections. Similarly, organizational learning is not
merely individual learning, yet organizations learn only through the
experience and actions of individuals" (p.9).
3.2 Types of Organisations
Argyris and Schon (1978) put forward a number of perspectives of
organisations. Although, probably not a complete list, it is useful to discuss
them here, as they form a foundation for understanding their concept of
organisational learning. Argyris and Schon (1978) state the following:
"An organisation is:
• a government, or polis,
• an agency,
• a task system.
Each of these perspectives will illuminate the sense in which an
organisation may be said to act. Further, an organization is:
• a theory of action,
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• a cognitive enterprise undertaken by individual members,
• a cognitive artifact made up of individual images and public maps.
Each of these descriptions will reveal the sense in which an
organization may be said to know something, and to learn" (p. 12).
Before we move into a discussion on the above perspectives of an
organisation, it will be useful to present a number of foundational concepts
with regards to Argyris and Schon's (1978) theory of organisational learning.
These are:
1. Espoused Theory: What we say that we do in situations. It is what
we believe we would do in a situation or to solve a problem. The
view that we tell the world what we would do.
2. Theory-in-Use: What we actually do in the situation. The fact that
the espoused theory and theory-in-use are not congruent is
generally not evident to the person. The theory-in-use is often at a
tacit level and generally takes some deep reflection to recognise it.
It can often be quickly observed by someone else but difficult to
point out to the person in question.
(Argyris & Schon, 1978).
To illustrate these concepts further, we can refer to the following:
"When someone is asked how he would behave under certain
circumstances, the answer he usually gives is his espoused theory
of action for that situation. This is the theory of action to which he
gives allegiance and which, upon request, he communicates to
others. However, the theory that actually governs his actions is his
theory-in-use, which may or may not be compatible with his
espoused theory; furthermore, the individual may or may not be
aware of the incompatibility of the two theories" (Argyris & Schon
1974, p.7 in Argyris & Schon 1978, p. 11).
37
With this in mind, we return to our discussion on organisations. Argyris and
Schon (1978) distinguish between a collectivity and an organisation in the
following ways. A collectivity will begin to evolve into an organisation when it
has established rule-governed ways of deciding, delegating and setting the
boundaries of membership. When this happens, it is said that this newly
formed entity is capable of acting. Moving on from the concept of 'acting' on
behalf of others for a common goal, it is argued that the new entity has
become political, or, as Argyris and Schon (1978) call it, "a polis" (p. 13). The
authors argue that it is true that individuals decide and act for the members,
but they do so in accordance with the rule-based governing values for
decision making, delegation and membership (Argyris & Schon, 1978).
If the entity described above continues on an ongoing basis, Argyris and
Schon (1978) call it an "Agency" which is "an instrument for continuing
collective action" (p. 14). The authors argue that once an agency is
established, it is possible to develop a "theory-in-use" for the agency from the
observable action that is taking place within the agency. An agency is said to
continually perform a set of complex tasks, to fulfill the function or goal of the
overall organisation.
In order to do this, the organisation has to develop a "task system" (Argyris &
Schon, 1978, p. 14). This comprises the way different organisational
components interact and "is at once a design for work and a division of labor"
(Argyris & Schon, 1978, p. 14).
Argyris and Schon (1978) talk about an instrumental theory of action. This is
bound up in the norms, strategies and assumptions that guide the
organisation on its path towards its overall objective. This is where Argyris and
Schon's argument begins to really take shape. The idea is that there are
generally two theories of action in place within an organisation. The first one is
to be found within formal organisational documentation, including
organograms, policy and procedure documents and job descriptions. This
theory of action, referring back to our earlier definitions, is the espoused
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theory of the organisation. It is what it tells the world what it does (Argyris &
Schon, 1978).
The crux of Argyris and Schon's argument is that the espoused theory and
theory-in-use, the second theory of action, are generally not congruent. Not
only are they incongruent but as a result of the tacit nature of the theory-in-
use, the incongruency is undiscussable. Not only is it not discussable, it
usually is not even seen. Another interesting aspect of Argyris and Schon's
(1978) argument is that it is the theory-in-use that is the major force in
constructing organisational identity.
To begin to discover this theory-in-use, we must observe what really happens
inside the organisation and not what the official documents tell us about what
happens. Argyris and Schon (1978) make a distinction here between an
outside view, just described as an observation of what happens, and an
internal view, described as "When members carry out the practices
appropriate to their organisation, they are also manifesting a kind of
knowledge. And this knowledge represents the organisation's theory-in-use as
seen from the inside" (p. 16).
3.3 Images and Maps
Argyris and Schon (1978) make an interesting point with regards to
organisational learning and the construction of personal images of the
organisation. Basically what is said to take place is that each individual in the
organisation is continually constructing a representation of the organisation as
a whole. A little later in our discussion, I will reflect on this aspect with regard
to mental models and organisational learning.
Due to the fact that our interpretations and representations will be influenced
by our worldviews, the representation that each individual constructs is argued
to be incomplete. Argyris and Schon (1978) state that as individuals continue
to investigate the organisation and themselves in relation to the organisation,
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these images of organisation change. They argue that each individual is doing
this kind of inquiry all the time. These inquiries, which become embodied in
the way people do things in the organisation, form the basis of the
organisations theory-in-use. It is also argued that, dependent on how well
these individual images are integrated into a organisational image on a
continual basis, forms what Argyris and Schon (1978) have termed, "an
organisation's knowledge of its theory-in-use" (p. 16).
What appears next in this text is a very interesting analogy of an organisation,
which is another way of saying 'Metaphor'. Argyris and Schon (1978) describe
an organisation as an "organism" (1978, p. 16). They go even further than this
with the following statement, "Organization is an artifact of individual ways of
representing organization" (Argyris & Schon p. 16). These statements capture
the underlying assumptions of the authors' views towards organisations. It
becomes understandable then, that if an organisation is viewed through an
'organic' metaphor and seen as the integration, to put it simply, of each
individual's image of the organisation, that Argyris and Schon (1978) come to
the following conclusion:
"Hence, our inquiry into organizational learning must concern itself
not with static entities called organizations, but with an active
process of organizing which is, at root, a cognitive enterprise.
Individual members are continually engaged in attempting to know
the organization, and to know themselves in the context of the
organization. At the same time, their continuing efforts to know and
to test their knowledge represent the object of their inquiry.
Organizing is reflexive inquiry" (pp. 16-17).
The authors go further and say that individual inquiry is necessary but not
sufficient for the type of learning we are talking about. In order for individuals
to compare, contrast and debate personal images, some form of external,
public images must be developed. Argyris and Schon (1978) call these public
images, "Organizational Maps" (p. 17). These maps describe the actual way
things are done in the organisation and can include diagrams of workflow,
compensation charts, statements of procedure etc "Whatever their form,
40
maps have a dual function. They describe actual patterns of activity, and they
are guides to future action ... Organizational theory-in-use, continually
constructed through individual inquiry, is encoded in private images and in
public maps. These are the media of organizational learning" (Argyris &
Schon, 1978, p. 17).
3.4 Organisational Learning - Argyris and Schon
A number of consistent themes or focus areas emerge out of the works of
Argyris and Schon (1978). The most prominent of these are the two concepts,
single-loop learning and double-loop learning. To strengthen the foundation,
let us examine the understanding that Argyris (1994) puts forward with regard
to learning. Although we have discussed an overview of what the authors
understand to be organisational learning, what follows are the details of that
overview.
3.5 Single Loop, Double Loop and Deutro-Leaming
Argyris (1994) has defined learning as happening under two conditions. "First,
learning occurs when an organization achieves what it intended; that is, there
is a match between its design for action and the actuality or outcome. Second,
learning occurs when a mismatch between intentions and outcomes is
identified and it is corrected; that is, a mismatch is turned into a match" (p.8).
The important distinction between the two types of learning is discovered in
how the mismatches are turned into matches.
Single-loop learning can be expressed as when a mismatch is detected and
then corrected within the current framework or value system operating within
the organisation. It takes as valid the current assumptions and values and
tries to operate, possibly, in a different way but still within the same
framework. The commonly used analogy is that of the thermostat. The
thermostat only knows when it is too hot or too cold. It has a set framework of
temperatures that it has to operate within and then addresses each 'mismatch'
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to bring them into the range of current practice. The thermostat never asks
itself whether the current range is a good range in the first place.
This brings us to double-loop learning. This can be understood in light of the
previous analogy of the thermostat. In double-loop learning, the mismatches
are corrected by first examining and questioning the governing variables and
then deciding what to do. It begins with the question: Is this temperature range
a good and valid range to have in this context? Argyris (1994) states that
these governing variables are "not the underlying beliefs or values people
espouse. They are the variables that can be inferred, by observing the actions
of individuals acting as agents for the organisation, to drive and guide their
actions" (p.9).
The following diagram shows single-loop and double-loop learning.
Match
Figure 2: Single and Double-Loop Learning (Argyris, 1994, p.8)
An interesting point that Argyris (1994) makes is that learning, as can be seen
in the diagram above, does not really occur until either a match or a mismatch
emerges out of the system. Further to this, he adds:
"From our perspective, therefore, learning may not be said to occur
if someone (acting for the organization) discovers a new problem or
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invents a solution to a problem. Learning occurs when the invented
solution is actually produced. This distinction is important because
it implies that discovering problems and inventing solutions are
necessary, but not sufficient conditions for organizational learning.
Organizations exist in order to act out and to accomplish their
intended consequences" (Argyris, 1994, p.9).
Argyris (1994) states that both types of learning are necessary and needed
within an organisation and that they fulfill different functions. "Single-loop
learning is appropriate for the routine, repetitive issues - it helps get the
everyday job done. Double-loop learning is more relevant for the complex,
non-programmable issues - it assures that there will be another day in the
future of the organization" (Argyris, 1994, p.9).
The third type of learning mentioned is called Deutro-Learning: Learning
about organisational learning. The organisation needs to learn how to engage
in single and double loop learning." When an organisation engages in deutro-
learning, its members learn, too, about previous contexts for learning" (Argyris
& Schon, 1978, p.27). It is a process whereby the organisation learns from
previous learning efforts, how it facilitated or inhibited organisational learning.
It is vital for this type of learning that the outcomes/results of this learning be
encoded into the organisational maps and images of the people within the
organisation.
I mentioned above that one of the crucial aspects to the argument put forward
by Argyris and Schon (1978) was the way in which mismatches were turned
into matches. At this point of the discussion, I will introduce another critical
point in their argument, the importance of double-loop learning and the
seeming inability of people to engage in such learning. This links back to our
earlier discussion about worldview and thought.
Argyris (1994) argues that when people try and double-loop learn, the
processes that they put in motion are actually counterproductive to their
intended purpose. Not only that, but at the same time people are unaware of
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the counterproductive measures they are implementing to try and double-loop
learn. It is argued, however, that people can often see these
counterproductive measures in other people. This could be likened to the
biblical principle of "Take the log out of your own eye before you try to take
the speck out of another persons eye". Argyris (1994) says that this,"... may
be due to a program in people's heads of which they must necessarily be
unaware" (p.9). This aligns very closely to the theory that Bohm (1996)
presents with regards to thought.
3.6 Model I Theory-in-Use
The concept of a theory-in-use has been discussed at length but what can be
added at this point is the interesting concept that Argyris (1994) puts forward
when he suggests that any unawareness or cover-up that takes place is
actually designed purposefully. "It suggests that the unawareness is designed.
It suggests that the incongruence is designed. It suggests, in other words, that
human beings must have a theory of action that they use to produce all these
difficulties" (Argyris, 1994, p.25).
This adds another dimension to our earlier discussion around thought and
worldview. From what I understand Argyris is saying, the cover up is
happening but it is 'designed1, as opposed to simply happening by chance. On
this point he argues against the 'attribution theorists', who claim that people
behave in certain ways simply because they have to as a result of it being
"human nature". Argyris (1994) adds to this argument and claims that his
research shows that, once people learn different theories-in-use, they are able
to behave in a manner different to that which is predicted by the attribution
theorists. Argyris concludes by claiming that human nature is not a static
entity but rather a changeable, dynamic process.
The most prolific theory-in-use that has emerged from the research of Argyris
and Schon (1978, 1996) is what has been termed Model I theory-in-use. From
reading this research, it is clear that the characteristics of Model I have been
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drawn from observable behaviour in a number of different contexts and within
a range of cultures.
The characteristics of Model I are as follows (Argyris, 1994):
"A Model I theory-in-use has four governing variables, or values, for
the actor to "satisfice." (1) strive for unilateral control, (2) minimize
losing and maximize winning, (3) minimize the expression of
negative feelings, and (4) be rational. Along with the governing
variables is a set of behavioral strategies such as (1) advocate your
views without encouraging inquiry (hence, remain in unilateral
control and hopefully win), and (2) unilaterally save face - your own
and other people's (hence, minimize upsetting others and making
them defensive)" (p.26).
Argyris (1994) argues that these governing variables form a master program
that influences the behavioural strategies that human beings produce. In
addition to this, Argyris claims that people can act in accordance with Model I,
the opposite of Model I, or swinging between the two. For example, let us
imagine the situation where I try to unilaterally control you, then at different
times, you unilaterally control me and then the long-term oscillation between
the two behavioral patterns occurs. Argyris (1994) adds that all the people he
has studied so far hold a model I theory-in-use and that once learned, the
strategies that people display in their behaviour, although complex, are
performed with ease and so quickly that they present themselves as
automatic. It is also argued that people develop the Model I theory-in-use
through a process of socialisation (Argyris, 1994).
Argyris (1994) then begins to expand on the ideas that we discussed earlier
concerning the process of thought. Speaking about a group of people asked
to give suggestions for a course of action within a conflict situation, he made
the following comment, "They were unaware of the many inferences that were
embedded in their reasoning processes because, according to their Model I
theory-in-use, everything they thought and said was not only true, it was
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obvious and concrete" (Argyris, 1994, p.27). So to refer back to the work of
Bohm (1996), one can see a very close parallel here.
To conclude this section, the following quotation will be useful to reinforce the
suggested parallel between Argyris and Bohm:
"What is also predictable from, and congruent with, Model I is that
such thoughts and actions will lead to unrecognized
inconsistencies, self-fulfilling prophecies, self-sealing processes,
and hence, escalating error. This, is turn, will lead to a world that
may be said to be unjust ... Injustice is a double-loop problem,
precisely the learning domain in which human beings are
programmed to be less than effective" (Argyris, 1994, p.27).
3.7 Model II Theory-in-Use
As an introduction to Model II it will be useful to state that Argyris and Schon
(1978) claim that the strategies needed to operate in Model II are not the
opposite of Model I. The governing values for Model II are: "valid information,
free and informed choice, and internal commitment. The behavior required to
fulfill these values also is not the opposite of Model I" (Argyris & Schon, 1978,
p. 136).
What I understand to be an underlying principle in Model II is the need to
confront and test the basic assumptions of 'current practice1 within an
organisation. Model II uses some strategies that operate within Model I,
advocacy, for example, but it uses this strategy within a Model II framework.
Hence the Model I aspect of advocacy, which is that you maximise winning, is
not used. Rather Model II combines the skills of advocacy and inquiry to bring
about a situation where people's assumptions are openly discussed and
confronted. This is similar to what has been called the "Ladder of Inference"
(Senge et al. 1994), where people are encouraged to use both advocacy and
enquiry to begin to discover, among other things, the mental models in
operation.
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One of the strategies that is not evident in Model I is power sharing among
relevant stakeholders, which requires joint task definition and control. The
issues of protecting yourself or others is rejected as it is viewed as a
defensive routine that creates a barrier to learning. There is a shift from
competition to competency. People are chosen to do tasks, make decisions
and carry out implementation on their competency and not as a result of trying
to out-shine other people. People operating within a Model II frame tend to try
and sweep in a wide variety of perceptions about a problem situation so that
the richest picture of the problem situation is created and decisions are based
on the availability of this valid and useful information (Argyris & Schon, 1978).
Argyris and Schon (1978) put it like this, "Every significant Model II action is
evaluated in terms of the degree to which it helps the individuals involved
generate valid and useful information (including relevant feelings), solve the
problem in such a way that it remains solved, and do so without reducing the
present levels of problem-solving effectiveness" (p. 138).
Although Argyris and Schon (1978) state that both learning is necessary and
needed, an emphasis on double-loop learning should exist within an
organisation. Their basic argument is that a move from Model I to Model II
theories-in-use will decrease the defensive patterns associated with Model I
and lead to an increase in the ability to double-loop learn. An overview of























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As mentioned earlier, Argyris (1994) argues that Model I is learnt through a
process of socialisation. As such, one would need to investigate the greater
social system or what we could call the 'learning system' to identify if this
argument remains valid. Argyris (1994) himself admits that this is not yet fully
proven, but has done the type of investigation we are discussing and has
come up with a number of learning systems. The first one that we shall
discuss is what Argyris and Schon (1978) have called a "Model 0 -1 Learning
System".
3.9 Model O -1 Learning Systems
Argyris and Schon (1978) have developed a learning system which they claim
predisposes an organisation to a certain kind of learning, in this case, what
they call limited learning. "... a model of organizations which are unlikely
either to correct first-order error by double-loop learning or to inquire into their














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3 needs a certain amount of unpacking if we are going to utilise the
meaning captured within the diagram to the full in our present discussion.
Argyris and Schon (1978) state that,"... it is more likely that a limited-learning
organisation, at any period of its evolution, displays at least embryonically the
full configuration of the system" (p.111). To add further clarity, Primary
inhibiting loops are described as, "...'primary' not in the sense of temporal
order, but in the sense of their primary importance among the processes
which make up the system" (Argyris & Schon, 1978, p.111). From what I
understand, primary inhibiting loops (PIL) are also generally on the
interpersonal level whereas secondary inhibiting loops (SIL) are more likely to
occur on the intra- and intergroup levels, while at the same time sustaining the
primary loops.
Column (1) contains elements of, as has been described earlier, an
organisation's instrumental theory of action. It is the way things happen within
the organisation. The characteristics listed are not particularly useful or
positive for an organisation but seem to flourish in most. The instrumental
theory of action of the organisation, within a Model I world, seems to be the
instigator of Model I interactions which create primary inhibiting loops. The
interaction between columns (1) and (2) creates a situation where the
"conditions for error become uncorrectable and trigger the very responses
which make them so" (Argyris & Schon, 1978, p. 112). So basically what
happens is that the column (1) characteristics interact with people who
operate in Model I worlds and hence trigger appropriate Model I responses
which in turn covers up the existence of the column (1) characteristics. When
this happens, as stated above, the conditions for error are unnoticed and the
feedback loop continues to operate and reinforce itself. One of the most
crucial aspects of primary inhibiting loops is that they, "... reinforce the
unawareness of their effects on organizational learning" (Argyris & Schon,
1978, p. 112).
Moving from here, we see that column (5) deals mainly with the group
dynamics level. It is argued that the interactions and behaviour patterns of
columns (1) - (4) begin to create a mirror image of interactions at the group
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level. Not only do the same interactions begin to take place, causing the
formation of secondary inhibiting loops, but also these SIL's in turn reinforce
the primary inhibiting loops. This type of reinforced Model I interactions at the
interpersonal and intra / intergroup level seems to bring about a mindset
which declares that the organisation is brittle and unchangeable. At this point
Argyris and Schon (1978) argue that,"... members learn to despair of double-
loop learning, the stage is set for games of deception" (p.114).
Games of deception, investigated in detail by Argyris (1993), become the
burning issues at the forefront of the organisational consciousness. What
seems to happen is that the games become of paramount importance and
concern to members of the organisation and, as we can agree in theory and
have experienced in practice, leads to a further unawareness of the real
errors. These types of games usually have the result of people thinking that
the organisation will never change and is on the brink of collapse. Intense
blame shifting begins to occur and is reinforced and very little public testing of
assumptions is implemented as this in itself has become an undiscussable
issue.
What is interesting in the system mapped by Argyris and Schon (1978) is that
even in the midst of all the interactions and feedback loops described above,
correction of error at a certain level does occur. It is at the level where
correction and detection of the errors is not threatening to the Model I
behavioural world in operation. These types of errors would seem to align
themselves with single-loop learning and ways of doing things better within
the current framework. From personal experience of this type of learning
system, one of the consequences of this type of error detection and correction
is that "progress" is being made and the organisation is really getting better,
but in actual fact, reflecting on this discussion, it only adds to the overall
unawareness. This is not to say that single-loop learning experiences
organisations go through are useless or totally negative. This would be wrong,
but what I think could be a result of this type of learning is a further
reinforcement of the larger system, that being a limited learning system.
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This leads us on to the issues of camouflage. When an organisation is
operating within a Model I world, anything that can cause personal or
organisation embarrassment or threat is fiercely and automatically avoided.
This is camouflage. Argyris and Schon (1978) state that camouflage can take
a number of forms, including hiding the issue, disguising the issue or even
denying that it exists. In addition to this, the organisation can present its
espoused theory while operating with an "open secret" (p. 116) about the
incongruity of the espoused theory and the theory-in-use. Common features of
camouflage also include blame shifting to external factors and going through
the motions of problem confrontation while privately conceding that nothing
will happen. One of the most interesting features is when an organisation
anticipates the consequences of uncorrectable error and builds these into
performance indicators (Argyris & Schon, 1978).
In order to be able to engage in camouflage an organisation needs to create
an amazingly complex system. This refers back to the point Argyris and
Schon make about the fact that theories-in-use are actually designed, albeit in
a manner that becomes so ingrained and automatic that it presents itself as
the natural thing to do. What would seem to happen is that the organisation
builds performance indicators that demonstrate the error exists, makes
margins for performance for its staff as a result of the error but at the same
time never recognising the error. The system is so strong that it is able to
accommodate the error, produce new levels of acceptable performance rather
than confronting the actual conditions of error.
Following on from here is the secondary level of camouflage that begins to
emerge. As the organisation hides, disguises or denies the existence of error,
it is confronted with the situation of needing to camouflage and camouflage
the camouflage. As much as the error needs to be hidden, it is just as
important that the hiding needs to be hidden. Argyris and Schon (1978) put it
this way, "In effect, we must tacitly agree not to discuss our denials and
disguises if they are to do their job. This, then, represents a further
impediment to deutro-learning" (p.117).
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When an organisation, operating within a Model I world, begins to inquire into
its learning system or the way it operates, Argyris and Schon (1978) argue
that another kind of primary inhibiting loop emerges. This is happens within
column (9) on figure 3. It is called a second-order loop, which functions in a
primary inhibiting loop fashion. This type of loop is caused by many of the
same factors involved in causing first-order primary inhibiting loops but it is
being reinforced by a lot of the consequences of the secondary inhibiting
loops, such as camouflage and the second order camouflage. In turn this type
of primary inhibiting loop, which blocks attempts to investigate the learning
system, reinforces and protects that learning system.
Finally, as a result of the complex interaction of first-order primary and
secondary inhibiting loops as well as the second-order inhibiting loops, it is
argued that there is a general decrease in the probability of double-loop and
deutro-learning as well as an increase in double-binds for individuals working
within this system. Argyris and Schon (1978) argue that double loop learning,
which they view as crucial to organisational learning, is dependent upon the
awareness of error within a learning system. As the present discussion has
shown us, the Model 0 -1 learning system has been designed to prevent any
such detection. Not only this, but it disallows deutro-learning. If the
organisation cannot double-loop learn as a result of the learning system in
place, then it is not possible for them to even begin to learn how to double-
loop learn.
Argyris and Schon (1978) then argue that this creates what is termed a
"double bind" (Bateson, 1972) for individuals within the system. They are said
to continually feel a sense of frustration and confinement. It is often described
as a 'lose/lose' situation. Argyris and Schon (1978) describe it as follows, "...
namely, one is caught in a no-win game and the rules of the game are
undiscussable" (p. 118).
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3.10 Model O - II Learning Systems
In an attempt to bring us out of the despair of the Model O -1 learning system
and behavioural world, let me begin to introduce what Argyris and Schon
(1978) have developed as an alternative. They have called it the Model 0 - II
learning system, one that is not limiting but rather open and encourages the
types of learning that Argyris and Schon argue is necessary for organisational
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Again, this diagram needs to be explained in a little more detail. As per the
Model 0 -1 map, column (1) and (3) interact. The difference being that column
(3) represents a Model II theory-in-use and hence the interaction produces
some very different results. Instead of producing a primary inhibiting loop, the
interaction produces three significant results. Firstly, error is detected.
Secondly, a Model II inquiry can begin once the error is detected and, as a
result of the Model II inquiry, double-loop and single-loop learning is possible.
What this results in is a negative feedback loop to the columns before. It is
negative in the sense that it begins to reduce the conditions for error,
whereas, the primary inhibiting loops of the O -1 learning system were positive
or reinforcing loops and continued to increase the scope for error by
reinforcing the conditions for error.
It is suggested that single-loop learning occurs relatively easily in the Model 0
- II system. This type of learning is also associated with techniques, actions,
or ways of operating. I would call this the more technical aspect of how the
organisation works. The error is detected, and the 'event - produce - evaluate1
section of the diagram is entered into without too much difficulty. Another loop
that emerges at this point which is not to clear from the diagram is that if, in
single-loop learning, the solution produced corrects the error, then the
learning stops there. If, on the other hand, the produced solution does not
correct the error, then the agent for organisational learning is taken back to
diagnosing the problem.
Coming to the next type of learning, double-loop learning, we begin to
examine the underlying governing values of the organisation. It isn't simply a
tweak of the existing goalposts, but rather seeing that the way we are
operating is pointing away from what we intended and want to happen. Argyris
and Schon (1978) argue that this type of learning requires that good dialectic
be operating in the organisation. It is also stated that this begins with a map to
bring about different perspectives of the problem. From here, a similar route
is taken as to that described with regard to single-loop learning. The 'invent -
produce - evaluate1 cycle begins.
57
Argyris and Schon (1978) then seem, from my perspective, to take a bit of a
leap of faith and say that once this happens, the results should be a bed of
roses. Most of the dysfunctional elements of intra- and inter-group dynamics
will disappear. Not only will they disappear, they will be replaced with very
functional group dynamics that will get the results intended by such groups.
Following on from such good wins up until this point, the groups will then
begin to believe that double-loop learning is possible and useful for
themselves and the organisation.
Finally column (8) and (9) begin to create a useful positive or reinforcing loop
with the learning system as a whole. The feedback that goes back into the
system strengthens the Model II theory-in-use, encourages the Model 0 - II
inquiry and so the story goes through to the end of the system. Argyris and
Schon (1978) add to this discussion with the following,"... and hence we have
a learning system that is simultaneously stable and subject to continual
change" (p. 144).
It was argued that unless organisational learning is embedded within the wider
organisational system, the benefits of such learning would be very limited.
What I understand them to be saying is that a learning system, as per Model
0 - II, will give rise to new problems. The difference will be that the system will
be robust and open enough to engage with the new problems in a way that
couples advocacy and inquiry, based firmly within a Model II theory-in-use.
The result being an, "...open-ended process in which cycles of organizational
learning create new conditions for error to which members of the organisation
respond by transforming them so as to set in motion the next phase of inquiry"
(Argyris & Schon, 1978, p. 144).
3.11 Dialectic
In the past few pages the term dialectic has been introduced. I think it would
be useful to clarify what is meant by this term. Argyris and Schon (1978) make
some level of distinction between single-loop, double-learning and deutro-loop
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learning when talking about organisational dialectic. In fact there is only really
one distinction made, that being whether the organisational norms and
governing variables are taken as given or if they are the cause of the inquiry.
For single-loop and deutro-learning, the organisational norms are taken as
given, although used in a slightly different manner. With single-loop learning,
the organisational norms are taken as given and the area of focus is on
effectiveness. The issue is whether we can do things better and did we learn
to do so. When deutro-learning is spoken of, there are two scenarios
presented. Firstly, when the organisational norms are shared by those
involved in the learning cycle. Secondly, a case is presented where the
organisation learns that the norms are no longer effective.
On the other side is double-loop learning. The difficulty with this type of
learning is that the norms and governing values are the very things that are in
transition. With this being the case, it is not plausible to use them as criteria
for whether learning is taking pace. This is where Argyris and Schon (1978)
say that the dialectic approach is so useful. They have therefore come up with
a number of questions that can be used to see if good organisational dialectic
is taking place. These questions are:
" Do members of the organization treat organizational assumptions as
testable? And do they search for disconfirmable data?
Are the members of the organization able to integrate, for example, the
images of organizational theory-in-use held by employees at different
levels and locations with those of management so as to make a single
organizational map capable of revealing the interconnections of
assumptions and values?
Do the members of the organization share memories of the
organization's past which provide them with a context for the
interpretation of present error?
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Has the organization found that its expectations to achieve specified
objectives are continually disappointed? Are the members then able to
respond to uncertainty by reflection and by efforts to restructuring their
perception of the problem?
Do the members test for congruence of organizational espoused
theory and theory-in-use?
Do the individual members oppose one another without the awareness
that their opposition represents a conflict of organizational values?
Or do the members couple advocacy of their own positions with inquiry
into the position of others? Do they keep open the possibility that
conflicting values could be internalised by the several members rather
than distributed among them by polarization?" (Argyris & Schon, 1978,
pp.145-146).
Argyris and Schon (1978) argue that these questions give the
organisation some practical tools to begin an inquiry into how well the
organisation is engaging in good dialectic. The questions go beyond
simply identifying whether an organisation is involved in dialectic, the
questions also provide a broad guideline as to how to engage and
develop a Model 0 - II learning system that is embedded in Model II
theories-in-use. If the features presented in the questions were not
happening within the organisation, Argyris and Schon (1978) argue that
it would be very difficult for that organisation to allow conditions for error
to emerge and be confronted. It would be difficult for that organisation to
double-loop learn. Henceforth, good organisational dialectic forms an
integral part of an organisation's ability to develop the skills necessary to
learn. Not only to learn, but also to learn in the manner described above
as organisational learning.
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3.12 Reflections on Argyris and Schon's Theory
When we step back and look at Argyris and Schon (1978), one being a
psychologist and the other a professor of philosophy, it sheds some light as to
why they have formulated the problem in the manner they have, a cognitive
problem. I would argue that since they have studied and become experts in
areas such as interaction patterns, behavior and cognition, this must have had
some, if not a considerable amount, of influence on the way that they have
formulated the problem. Further, we can see that these two authors "create"
the organisation they have worked with as a set of interactions between
people and that the problems that block organisational learning are the
problems created by the way these interactions occur.
Although agreeing with a lot of what they say, there still seems to be a gap
that exists in practice. There is not too much guidance about how the elusive
jump from a Model 0 -1 to a Model O - II learning system comes about. And
although this is taken up in later publications by, particularly, Argyris (1993,
1994) the words of Argyris and Schon (1978) resound:
"As mentioned at the outset, we have not been able to find in our
experience or to draw from the literature descriptions of Model 0 -
II learning systems with the degree of concreteness that was
possible for Model O -1. Nor can we depend on the reader to fill in
the gaps with his or her own knowledge because we predict that
few, if any, readers have observed organizations that double-loop
learn" (p. 147).
This statement has certain parallels to that of Bohm (1996) where he
emphasises the importance of dialogue, but ends up by basically saying that it
is not possible, or at least extremely difficult, to have the dialogue that he is
talking about.
What I also found interesting with the work of Argyris and Schon was that they
really didn't deal too much with issues of structure. Contrasting this against
the work of Garratt (1987), who seems to stress the importance of the role of
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the leader in the organisation and the need for a certain structure within the
organisation. Garratt's concern seemed to emerge from his extensive work
within companies that he called "Brainless" and the inevitable conclusion of
failure for these organisations. Garratt also places a big emphasis on the
directional role of leaders / managers.
Actually this is where Argyris and Schon and Garratt are similar. Both say that
unless organisational change is implemented and lead by the top, it is
doomed to fail. Garratt goes as far to say that it is the responsibility of the
leader to implement an organisational learning culture. But where they seem
to differ rather dramatically is the area of structure or hierarchy (Argyris &
Schon, 1978; Garratt, 1987).
When I started reading Garratt, it seemed like I was reading Stafford Beer
(1966, 1967, 1981, 1985, 1994). Garratt (1987) states that there are three
levels of hierarchy that are essential to the effective performance of an
organisation. These are, "external monitoring, integrating and direction-giving
and operational planning and actions" (p. 12). Garratt (1987) even uses
terminology very similar to Beer and calls the "Integrating and Direction-giving
levels" the "Business Brain" (p. 13). This is the level that Garratt begins to
sweep in concepts of organisational learning, stating that it is so important for
there to be a "Brain" within the organisation. "If it is not possible for an
organism to learn, then it will not survive. That is why having a business brain
is such an evolutionary competitive advantage. Without a brain capable of
abstractions we would be reduced to sign/stimulus predetermined behaviour
insufficient to cope with our environmental changes" (Garratt, 1987, p. 18).
What is also interesting to note from this quote is the organism metaphor that
is again used with regards to an organisation.
Another area where Garratt can be linked to Argyris and Schon is in his call
for directors to move from specialists to generalists. Garratt (1987) argues that
this will happen when managers begin to use a different set of values. This
can be aligned with the concept of Theories-in-use and the need to change
from Model I to Model II.
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Garratt (1987) puts forward the arguments of Reg Revans who states that,
"for an organisation to survive, its rate of learning must be equal to, or greater
than, the rate of change in its external environment" (Revans (1982) in
Garratt, 1987, p.37). Looking further into the field of change, Garratt
introduces the concept of first-order and second-order change. These
concepts can be paralleled to single and double-loop learning respectively.
Garratt (1987) states that organisational learning is a useful strategy to cope
with change. Again, he places the emphasis on the directors and states the
following:
"What is needed for directors is the ability to ask discriminating
questions of those experts so that specialist inputs can be
maximized whilst the directorial perspective is kept above all
specialisms... The directors must learn to ask good quality
questions so as not to be fooled by their experts. Revans plays
upon the notion of 'looking after one's Ps and Qs' and describes the
formula for organizational learning as L=P+Q" (Garratt, 1987, p.46).
Finally Garratt (1987) states that the minimum conditions for a learning
climate to develop within an organisation are:
"1. People at all levels of the organization are encouraged to learn
regularly and rigorously from their work and to feed back such
learning to other parts of the organization which could use them.
2. Systems are set up to ensure that the learning is moved to those
parts of the organization which need it.
3. Learning is valued and rewarded in the organization.
4. The organization is seen to continuously transform itself through
the application of its learning, led by the attitudes and behaviour of
its directors" (p.59).
What I do think is useful about Garratt's (1987) work is that it does raise the
question of structure and its importance within the development of a learning
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organisation. This is an area that Argyris and Schon (1978) seem to disregard
for the most.
Another influential writer in this field is Arie de Geus (1997). His book, "The
Living Company", introduces some of the ideas he has towards learning within
organisations. From what I understand of this text, the crux of learning is
centred on the external environment and the future. The book seems to be
very much based upon research that he carried out within the Shell
organisation in order to find out what it was about organisations that made
them last for a long time,
From the research carried out, de Geus (1997) stated that a number of
common characteristics emerged within the companies studied. The most
important characteristic was the ability to adapt and change to the changing
external environment so that the organisation is always relevant to the world it
is operating in. Following on from this research was the development of what
is now known as scenario planning. Kees Van der Heijden (1996) is also a
well known author in this field.
One of the key concepts within scenario planning is the development of
different possible futures that an organisation may well have to face in the
near future. Once the futures have been developed, the organisation then
evaluates its current business idea to see how it would survive within the
different futures. The idea being that the organisation must develop a
business plan that is robust enough to operate well to highly effectively in one
or a number of these different futures.
Relating this type of learning to Argyris and Schon (1978), I see a distinct link
between double-loop learning and scenario planning. The idea of different
possible futures forces the organisation to ask the question, "How will we,
operating as we currently do, survive in this future?" It is such a vitally
importance question and allows the organisation to really begin to look at the
way it is currently operating and some of the assumptions it is making about
the present and the future.
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In effect, it helps the organisation to re-look at the theory-in-use within the
organisation and confront this through the different futures that have been
developed. I believe one of the most confining aspects of a Model I theory-in-
use is that it allows only one possible future to emerge. That being the case,
learning and change are only ever going to occur within the confines of that
one future and that theory-in-use. As a result, an organisation can be
preparing itself for a future that only exists within the walls of the organisation.
The consequences of such thinking can be disastrous.
Not wanting to create the dichotomous good/bad, single loop/double loop
learning situation, but I can see that if there is only one future being accepted
as valid, the only type of learning taking place will be single-loop learning. An
organisation will not likely challenge the basic assumptions it operates with if
those basic assumptions fit the only future possible within the organisation.
Following on from this, I can also see that scenario planning would be a very
useful way of allowing what Argyris and Schon (1978) call the conditions for
error to emerge and hence the opportunity to begin to double-loop learn.
This is the reason that the production and development of the potential futures
is vitally important. If the organisation is going to accept them as valid, the
research and development must be wide reaching and inclusive of all
stakeholders. If this does not happen, Model I theories-in-use can begin to
operate and the futures can simply be rejected as not valid and the
organisation will more than likely not change.
The opposite of this would be that the organisation is very involved in the
development of the futures, accepts them as possible and valid and therefore
can be used as the catalyst to change. This process would at least reduce the
potential for outright, unquestioned rejection of the futures. I believe that it
would also improve the likelihood for the acceptance of new ideas and ways
of operating in that the organisation would have to confront current best
practices within the light of different, possible and valid futures. As such, I can
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see that scenario planning is a very practical tool for the development of good
dialectic within the organisation.
As a way of concluding this section on organisational learning, I believe it
would be useful to mention the work of Peter Senge (1990, 1994, 1999). I
made reference to Senge at the beginning of this document and believe that
he has done a great deal in widening the audience and increasing the
popularity of systems thinking.
His most popular book, "The Fifth Discipline" (1990) has some very useful
insights. When I reflect on the relation between Senge's work and that of
Argyris and Schon (1978), there are some similarities. This is in the area of
mental models, systems thinking and the use of advocacy coupled with
enquiry.
Mental models, paradigms and theories-in-use seem to speak of the same
concept. It deals with recognising that people operate from a particular
framework. The difference in emphasis that I see between the authors is that
Senge (1990) focuses on the fact that people's mental models can be vastly
different, being developed through the variety of life experiences people have
had. This is in contrast with Argyris and Schon (1978) who state that basically
everyone operates within a Model I theory-in-use.
I don't think that the different emphases of the authors are diametrically
opposed. I believe Senge (1990) to be saying that people have different
worldviews and these need to be considered when working within an
organisation. Argyris and Schon (1978), on the other hand, are saying that,
this being the case and with different worldviews in operation, there seems to
be an over arching theory-in-use that most people ascribe to.
I believe that the major difference between the authors is that Senge's (1990)
materials are for the manager. It is written in a very accessible way which
provides some practical tools to begin to develop a learning organisation and
the use of case studies throughout the texts seems to confirm the intended
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audience and use of the book. A problem that I can see with this type of text
is that managers can see it simply as a recipe book. All one has to do is follow
these few steps and suddenly the organisation is going to learn in a
meaningful way.
With this in mind and reflecting upon Argyris and Schon (1978) I believe that it
is also easy to fall into the trap of thinking that this is a very straightforward
process. The very fact that Argyris and Schon (1978) state that they have not
seen many, if any, Model O-ll learning systems in operation, bears testament
to the fact that this is not an easy thing to do. In fact, I am left with the
question, "How does one begin to reduce the gap between theory and
practice and how does a manager implement this in their workplace?" I
believe that this could have been one of the challenges that Senge (1990)
wanted to confront in writing his books in the style chosen.
With the above reflections and comments made, I believe that Argyris and
Schon (1978) have developed a very insightful theory of organisational
learning. It captures and investigates what I believe to be the very core issues
affecting learning within organisations. Although at times difficult to access,
the theory presented sets out a well developed understanding of the dynamics
within organisations and offers a form of solution. The apparent weakness
seems to lie within the area of being able to confirm or disconfirm the
truthfulness of their theory in practice.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CHANGE
Learning and change are so intricately intertwined that it becomes difficult to
imagine one happening in isolation from the other. In the most general sense,
it could be argued that if one has learnt something new, then that person has
changed. Once learnt, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 'unlearn' something
and return to the state prior to learning whatever was learnt. Realising that the
relationship between learning and change does exist, it is worthwhile to
investigate the current understanding of change and the available approaches
so often employed in the management of change.
What seems to emerge from the review of change literature is the strong
allegiance to a model of change first presented by Lewin (Lewin, 1952, in
Dawson, 1994). The model comprises three stages that an organisation
needs to go through in order to be successful in a change process. These
stages are 'unfreezing', 'changing' and 'refreezing'. Although a certain amount
of criticism has been levelled at this model of change, when you begin to look
closely at a number of different models, as we will shortly do, one can see a
similar trend occurring. See Table 2 below.
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4.1 Moss Kanter, Stein and Jick Model of Change
Let us start with one of the better-known writers on change, Rosabeth Moss
Kanter. Kanter has written a number of books on the subject, notably "The
Change Masters" (1983). The model presented in "The Challenge of
Organisational Change" (Kanter, Stein, & Jick, 1992) is called, "The 'Big
Three' Model: Three kinds of Motion, Three Forms of Change, Three Roles in
the Change Process" (p. 14).
The types of motion that are mentioned within the above title are:
1. The motion of the organisation within its environment. This is the 'big
picture' change. The type of change that affects all organisations within a
sector and possibly more broadly. It could be concerned with aspects such
as government policy, consumer trends, competitors etc.
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2. The internal motion, how the parts of the organisation are relating to one
another. This deals with the type of change often associated with
restructuring, downsizing or reengineering. The term "life cycle" (Kanter,
Stein & Jick, 1992, p. 15) is used with regards to an organisation and the
path it takes to maturity.
3. The final type of motion mentioned is classified as political. When groups
or individuals begin to engage in power struggles towards establishing the
controlling interest in decision making, a number of changes come about.
After presenting the three kinds of motion within an organisation, the following
forms of change are proposed:
1. Identity changes: This seems parallel to the first kind of motion in that it
involves the relationship between the organisation and its environment. It
is best captured by the following, "As environmental movement presents
pressures and challenges for change, organizations can subtly change
their identities by changing their relationships to their environments:
changing the businesses in which they operate, the products they offer to
the market, the investors who supply capital, and so forth" (Kanter, Stein &
Jick, 1992, p. 15).
2. Coordination changes: Again this aligns itself to the second type of motion.
It is related to the types of changes that occur as a result of restructuring
the organisation. The way departments interrelate and the organisation as
a whole is structured.
3. Control changes: Finally, changes that result from the political motion
within an organisation. "This leads to makeover through takeover or other
changes triggered by shifts in ownership or governance" (Kanter, Stein &
Jick, 1992, p. 15).
Coming to the end of the Big-Three change model, the role players or "action
roles" as they are called are differentiated. To a certain extent these action
roles tally up with the divisions that have gone before in this model, but not to
the extent between the types of motion and the types of change.
1. Change Strategists: These are the people concerned with the relationship
between the organisation and the environment. They are called upon to
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set direction for the organisation. It is stated (Kanter, Stein & Jick, 1992)
that these roles are generally occupied by senior management and occur
at the beginning of a change process.
2. Change Implementors: This action role is generally associated with middle
management that is given the responsibility of implementing the change
strategy developed by the above group. It deals with the internal
structuring and internal relationships of the organisation. To clarify this
role, "Change implementation, as we are using the concept here, involves
project management and execution rather than conception" (Kanter, Stein
&Jick, 1992, p. 16).
3. Change Recipient: The people at the end. Those that are most likely to be
the effected by the change process. This role is often linked to the 'bottom'
of the organisation and the people who have very little influence over the
effects of the change process. "A good deal of the tension that invariably
arises in major organizational change programs is the direct result of the
disjunction between those directing and implementing change - both of
whom are sufficiently involved and have at least a degree of control over
the change - and those who are powerless, the passive recipients, as it
were" (Kanter, Stein & Jick, 1992, p. 16).
With the above description of the types of motion, types of change and the
action roles in place, the focus then moves to what these people in the action
roles are meant to do. A number of steps are presented in what has been
referred to as, "Charting a course for change" (Kanter, Stein & Jick, 1992
p. 386).
Kanter, Stein and Jick (1992) have developed four "rules" of the road for
charting the course for change. These include:
1. Appreciate the difference inherent in other 'changemakers' viewpoints.
2. Respect - but challenge - the ten commandments and their applicability
within your own organisation.
3. Ensure that the dialogue and communication among the various
constituencies has meaning and purpose
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4. Respond flexibly, even opportunistically, not only to what occurs outside
the organisation, but also how the change process is faring within the
organisation" (Kanter, Stein & Jick, 1992, p.386).
Let us look a little further into each of these rules of the road. To begin with,
let us investigate what is meant by:
Appreciate the difference inherent in other 'changemakers' viewpoints.
As has already been outlined above, this model of change involves three
action roles. This 'rule' asks for the different role players, whether strategists,
implementors or recipients, to begin to realise and appreciate the differences
between these role players.
The core assumption attached to this rule is that all the stakeholders are
making the change. In effect, the three levels of action roles make up the
entire organisation and therefore it is essential for the organisation to
understand that everybody must be involved if the change process is going to
be successful.
It is stated (Kanter, Stein & Jick, 1992) that 'Appreciating other
Changemakers' Differences' is a "prerequisite to applying the subsequent
'rules of the road' that we recommend...That harmony will not be possible
unless the roles themselves are understood" (p.387).
Evaluating the Ten Commandments
Before we begin to evaluate the ten commandments, we need to take a
minute and investigate exactly what they are. Table 3 below gives a bullet
point description of the Ten Commandments:
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organisation and its need
for change.
2. Create a shared vision
and a common direction.
3. Separate from the
past.
4. Create a sense of
urgency
5. Support a strong
leader role.
Description
This basically requires of management an detailed
understanding of the organisation, its environment
and the subsequent impact of the suggested
change process.
This stage does not mean the creation of a neat
mission and vision statement. It is a deeper
process whereby the organisation becomes
gripped by a desired and possible future that is
different to what currently exists. This process
stretches people's imaginations as to what is
possible and unites the organisation in a central
forward direction.
At a certain point within a change process, the
organisation must begin to 'break ties' with the
past. Routines and work functions that are not
working or are not in line with the desired future
must be removed from the organisations daily
activities.
If change is deemed necessary but not obvious to
the entire organisation, especially the
implementors and the recipients of change, then
the change leader needs to create a sense of
urgency. Unless this is created, the organisation
will not align itself with the change process.
This commandment states that an organisation
should not try to implement change without a
strong leadership role to guide and drive the
process. This person is involved in driving just
about all of the ten commandments.
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6. Line up political
sponsorship.
The change leader alone cannot make change
happen. For a change process to be successful,
the change leader needs to be supported by both
the people who have the 'power' within the
organisation and those are going to be most
affected by the change (Kanter, 1983).
7. Craft an
implementation plan.
This puts the 'meat on the bones' of the vision
The vision is the destination, the guiding light
whereas the implementation plan is more of a
road map of how to get there.
8. Develop enabling
structures.
This requires the organisation to develop
structures and process that support and facilitate
the change. It is argued that this can often be a
critical precursor to any organisational
transformation (Kanter, Stein & Jick, 1992).
9. Communicate, involve
people and be honest.
The underlying assumption of this commandment
is that the more you involve people in the
decisions that will affect them, the greater the trust
developed between the different stakeholders and





This stage involves the leaders of the change to
begin to develop processes and structures that
reward alignment to the change process. These
processes should move towards the creation of a
ulture and a "way of doing things" that matches
the image of the transformed organisation.
Adapted from (Kanter, Stein, Jick, 1992, p.383). ~ ~
Turning our attention back to the second rule of the road, 'Evaluating the Ten
Commandments', Kanter, Stein and Jick (1992) state that these
commandments provide good, common sense advice with regards to the
dynamics of change. The warning or precaution put forward in this rule is that
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the organisation must evaluate these commandments in terms of the
particular context in which they are working.
A number of questions are presented to help an organisation in this particular
regard. These include, "Are we addressing the real needs of the company, or
following the path of least resistance? How shared is the vision? How do we
preserve anchors to the past while moving to the future? Does everyone need
to feel the same sense of urgency? Can change recipients, far down in the
hierarchy, have an impact? How do we handle those who oppose change?
How much change can this organisation absorb?" (Kanter, Stein & Jick, 1992,
p.388).
Ensuring Meaningful Communication
This rule of the road seems to overlap with the ninth commandment, but the
authors are clear to articulate exactly what they mean by communication in
this case. It does not simply mean keeping stakeholders up-to-date about the
progress of the mandated change process. It goes much further than that. It
attempts to bring about the engagement of all the stakeholders on a
continuing basis with regard to the change process.
The authors talk about "dialogue between the different changemakers"
(Kanter, Stein & Jick, 1992, p.388). This type of communication involves
meetings and forums that allow the different stakeholders to voice their
concerns about the process. Not only their concerns, but also their opinions
and thoughts about the process. These types of forums are hoped to create a
much more informed understanding of what change means to the organisation
at all of its different levels. It also allows useful feedback to flow to the change
leaders. It is hoped that this type of communication would continually build
trust and support for the change process. It is argued that if people are 'heard'
and are able to input into the process as opposed to feeling that it is simply
being pushed from "on high" and they have no choice but to accept it, the
success of the change is more likely (Kanter, Stein & Jick, 1992).
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Reacting Flexibly and Opportunistically
This rule of the road presents another very useful challenge to the change
process and particularly, the ten commandments. It acknowledges that the ten
commandments implicitly assume a degree of control that "simply doesn't
exist when large-scale change is being implemented" (Kanter, Stein & Jick,
1992, p.389). The central theme of this rule is that the change process is a
very dynamic one. Although a degree of guidance and certainly a destination
can be plotted before departure, the change leaders need to be aware of the
fact that the exact course should not be set in stone. The organisation needs
to be able to "react" to the turbulent seas of change just as well as they
charted the original course.
Interestingly enough, there is a focus again on the ten commandments.
Kanter, Stein and Jick (1992) argue that the assumptions underpinning the ten
commandments need to be contemplated in addition to the already stated
evaluation. The major point presented is that some of the actions attached to
the ten commandments involve a certain amount of risk and a degree of
uncertainty which must be looked at and understood before an organisation
sails off into the oceans of change.
To conclude, Kanter, Stein and Jick (1992) present a paradox that emerges
out of the ten commandments. The commandments are basically a set of
guidelines and action strategies to implement change in a way that maximises
change and predictability and, inversely, minimises uncertainty and risk. The
problem with this, as presented by Kanter, Stein and Jick (1992), is that
change and transformation generally require a certain degree of risk taking
and uncertainty.
The proposed answer to this dilemma is an evaluative approach to change.
What I mean by this, with regards to understanding the authors' perspective,
is that an organisation must learn to cope with change on an ongoing basis.
After each stage of change occurs, the organisation must take time to
evaluate the change and then move ahead. This move forward could
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potentially include adaptations to the original course due to the evaluation of
where the change process has reached up until this point, Kanter, Stein, and
Jick (1992) describe this process as follows, "As alluded to earlier, change
implementors have a common sensation of just 'muddling along' without clear
progress. But in fact, properly managed, 'muddling along1 can be the most
effective way of handling multiple changes and complex situations" (p,390).
In summary, the Big Three model presents three types of motion, three forms
of change and three roles within the change process. I have presented a more
detailed account of each of these categories with a particular emphasis on the
ten commandments and the four rules of the road. From here we turn our
attention to one other similar view on change and I will conclude with a
presentation of Dawson's Processual Approach to change (Dawson, 1994).
4.2 John Kotter's Model of Change
Moving on to the other similar approach to change, we will take up with John
Kotter's (1996) eight-stage process. Kotter, in his book "Leading Change"
(1996), presents eight stages to the successful management of a change
process. These are:
1. Establishing a Sense of Urgency
2. Creating a Guiding Coalition
3. Developing a Vision and Strategy
4. Communicating the Change Vision
5. Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action
6. Generating Short-Term Wins
7. Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change
8. Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture
(Kotter, 1996).
Kotter (1996) introduces his eight-stage process with a parallel set of eight
mistakes that, in his experience, are the most common reasons why change
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fails. These eight mistakes and a brief description of why they are mistakes
are presented in Table 4 below.
Table 4: Why Organisations Fail to Transform
Why Organisations Fail to Transform
Error Description
1. Allowing too much
complacency.
Kotter states that the biggest reason for failure o
change initiatives is the lack of urgency within an
organisation. He argues that if complacency is high
change is extremely difficult and often doomed from
the beginning. In addition to this factor, Kotter (1996)
states that management often,"... overestimate how
much they can force change on an organisation. They
underestimate how hard it is to drive people out of
their comfort zones. They don't recognise how their
own actions can inadvertently reinforce the status
quo" (p.5).
2. Failing to create a
sufficiently powerful
guiding coalition.
This coalition is not just the CEO (Chief Executive
Officer) of the organisation, but rather has the real
power within the organisation. This, of course, would
include the CEO and other senior managers, but also
other powerful stakeholders in terms of, "... formal
titles, information and expertise, reputations and
relationships and the capacity for leadership" (Kotter,
1996, p.6).
. Underestimating
the power of vision
Kotter (1996) places a special emphasis on the power
of vision. He states that out of all the elements needed
in a successful change process, none is more
mportant than a useful vision. It provides the guiding
ight that facilitates unity to a purpose or destination
that the organisation has set it self (Kotter, 1996).
I.
Undercommunicating
he vision by a factor
Kotter (1996) argues that unless the vision is
ommunicated effectively and sufficiently, people will
generally not see the benefits of change and hence
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will not support the change and will not change their
own behavior.
Whether the obstacle is 'real' or perceived, unless it is
confronted and removed, change will becoming
increasingly more difficult. If the organisation is not
aligned to the new vision, and this manifests itself in
structures and behaviours (particularly of people in
management), the masses will not generally support
the change (Kotter, 1996).
Kotter (1996) argues that change, especially complex,
organisation-wide change, is not an overnight
process. The risk involved here deals with the loss of
momentum if short-term wins are not identified and
acknowledged.
The title is fairly self-explanatory. If the organisation
declares victory in the change initiative too early in the
process, all could be lost. Kotter (1996) states, "Until
changes sink down deeply into the culture, which for
an entire company can take three to ten years, new
approaches are fragile and subject to regression"
(p. 13).
Until behaviour in the organisation changes so that it
is aligned with the new vision, a change has not really
taken place. "Until new behaviours are rooted in social
norms and shared values, they are always subject to
degradation as soon as the pressures associated with
a change effort are removed" (Kotter, 1996, p. 14).
With the eight errors of change in place, let us now move onto Kotter's (1996)
eight-stage process as mentioned above, starting with 'Establishing a Sense
of Urgency1. Seeing that the titles of the eight-stage process are fairly self-
explanatory and that a brief description of the paralleling eight errors have
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been given, I will simply present highlights of each stage with reference to the
usefulness for this document.
Establishing a Sense of Urgency
As we saw in the description of the error above, complacency is a major threat
to the success of organisational change. Kotter (1996) presents a useful
range of sources of complacency. This is shown in figure 5 below:
Figure 5: Sources of Complacency
Too much happy talk
from senior
management.




























systems that focus on
the wrong performance
indexes.
I will pick up on a few of the sources that need a little more explanation "Too
many visible resources" was cited as a source of complacency. Here Kotter
1996) talks about the exuberant excess that he saw so often in successful
firms. The boardrooms, the entrance halls, the offices, all screamed of
success and Kotter (1996) assigns an underlying message of "We are rich
we are winners, we must be doing something right. So relax Have lunch"
(P39). With this kind of obvious excess, it is difficult for people to see the
urgency and the potential impending crisis (Kotter, 1996).
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Moving clockwise around the figure above, the next four sources, "Low overall
performance standards", "Organizational structures that focus employees on
narrow functional goals", "Internal measurements systems that focus on the
wrong performance indexes" and "A lack of sufficient performance feedback
from external sources" all seem to deal with measurement in some way or
another and can be addressed together. Kotter (1996) has found that often
the complacency was kept high by low performance standards. The standards
that were set for the organisation were easily achievable and as such
everyone was meeting targets and the perspective of success and progress
was built and reinforced. Linked to this point, Kotter states that internal
measurement systems are biased towards everyone meeting goals. Looking
even further at this aspect, Kotter argues that all the feedback people received
came from this biased measurement systems. With the result that all of the
feedback was generated internally and nothing external to the organisation
was coming through (Kotter, 1996).
On top of that, each department was given narrowly defined goals and targets
which then helped to create a fragmented organisation that lacked the overall,
global perspective.
Adding to the point of solely internally generated data, Kotter (1996) adds that
many organisations have a culture that punishes people who try to integrate
some forms of external data that may force a confrontation or challenge to the
status quo. In addition to the already complex system being presented here is
the peculiar capacity for human beings to deny and discard any information
that does not meet their expectations. This particular statement having
considerable likeness to the Model O-l Learning System as described by
Argyris and Schon (1978) earlier in this paper.
Finally, Kotter (1996) describes a situation where senior management's
"Happy Talk" creates a comfort zone that people relax into. It is argued that
the source of this is more often than not, past success. Kotter (1996) puts it
this way:
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"Much of the problem here is related to historical victories - for the
firm as a whole, for departments, and for individuals. Past success
provides too many resources, reduces our sense of urgency, and
encourages us to turn inward. ... Big egos and arrogant cultures
reinforce the nine sources of complacency, which, taken together,
can keep the urgency rate low even in an organization faced with
major challenges and managed by perfectly intelligent and
reasonable people" (p42).
This quote also shows alignment to Argyris and Schon's (1978) Model O-l
learning systems that reinforce the status quo. Although Argyris and Schon
detail the reasons why in a much more thorough manner, the similarity is
obvious.
Kotter (1996) then proceeds to present a number of techniques to increase
the Urgency Level and discusses issues such as "The Role of Crises", "The
Role of Middle and Lower-Level Managers" and "How Much Urgency is
Enough?" (pp 45-49).
To touch briefly on "Creating the Guiding Coalition", Kotter (1996) provides
the reader with four key characteristics to an effective coalition. These include:
1. Position Power: Make sure that you have enough people on board so that
change can progress. Do the people not in the coalition have the "power"
to block progress?
2. Expertise: Make sure that you have the necessary expertise from a variety
of areas within the organisation so that decisions taken with regards to
change are informed and intelligent.
3. Credibility: Is the make-up of your group credible enough throughout all
sectors of the organisation? Will this coalition be respected by the
organisation as a whole to the point that the job gets done?
4. Leadership: Have you selected a group of people that have proven
leadership, who will be able to lead and drive this change process?
(Adapted from Kotter, 1996, p.57)
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Although an important, if not crucial ingredient within this change process, I
will not be looking at "Creating a Vision". Kotter (1996) presents a fairly
straightforward approach to this and it would be pointless to simply repeat
what he has said. What I am particularly interested in is the aspect of
communicating this vision.
Kotter (1996) puts forward seven key elements with regards to communicating
the vision. These are:
1. Simplicity
2. Metaphor, analogy and example
3. Multiple forums
4. Repetition
5. Leadership by example
6. Explanation of seeming inconsistencies
7. Give-and-take" (p.90).
Out of these 7 techniques, numbers 4,6 and 7 are of most interest. The use of
repetition is an interesting point. The repetition mentioned here does include
talking about the same thing repeatedly, but the examples given show that it is
done in a more meaningful way that helps people 'learn' about the vision and
see how it really affects their lives. Kotter (1996) explains it this way, "This
happens not because the public relations department takes in 'vision
distribution' as a "project". This happens because dozens of managers,
supervisors, and executives look at all of their daily activities through the lens
of the new vision. When people do this, they can easily find many meaningful
ways to talk about the direction of change, communications that can always
be tailored to the specific person or group with whom they are talking" (p.94).
Kotter (1996) pinpoints addressing inconsistencies within an organisation as
in important issue with regards to change. If the organisation is going through
a change process, but seemingly only one part is being changed, which often
converts into "being reduced, re-engineered or down-sized", then this
inconsistency would need to be addressed. Kotter argues that simple, honest
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communication is the best strategy. Acknowledge the seeming inconsistency
and communicate what is being done about it (Kotter, 1996).
Finally, the people involved in communicating the vision need to be able to
listen. The major argument here is that most people would need to grapple
with the personal and organisational issues that are coming to the fore
through the change process. A forum where people are able to ask questions
that help them to deal with the concerns that appear to them most commonly
facilitates this. This type of two-way communication also provides the
essential element of feedback about the change process (Kotter, 1996).
To conclude, I want to examine some of the aspects of Kotter's approach with
regards to Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture. Kotter (1996) puts
forward an interesting argument as to why culture is so powerful:
1. Because individuals are selected and indoctrinated so well.
2. Because the culture exerts itself through the actions of hundreds or
thousands of people.
3. Because all of this happens without much conscious intent and thus is
difficult to challenge or even discuss.
"(p.151).
What I find interesting about the above three points is how they reflect the
learning model presented by Argyris and Schon (1978). What Kotter (1996)
talks about when he uses the term culture is really what Argyris and Schon
(1978) talk about when they mention Learning Systems, in this case the
Model 0 - I learning system. The system does indoctrinate people, in a very
real sense it controls how people behave, although the people themselves
collude in reinforcing the system and finally, the system is undiscussable and
simply, 'just the way we do things around here'.
In conclusion, Kotter (1996) puts forward the following guidelines for
managers about anchoring changing in a culture:
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" Comes last, not first: Most alterations in norms and shared values come at
the end of the transformation process.
Depends on results: New approaches usually sink into a culture only after it's
very clear that they work and are superior to old methods.
Requires a lot of talk: Without verbal instruction and support, people are often
reluctant to admit the validity of new practices.
May involve turnover. Sometimes the only way to change a culture is to
change key people.
Makes decisions on succession crucial: If promotions processes are not
changed to be compatible with the new practices, the old culture will reassert
itself (p. 157).
4.3 Dawson's Processual Approach to Change
Moving on from Kotter (1996), I will now focus on a 'Processual Approach' to
organisational change with particular reference to Dawson (1994). Dawson's
point of departure for his development of a processual framework of change is
the inadequacies he finds within the contemporary literature on the
management of change. Dawson (1994) claims that almost all current
management programs adopt Lewin's three-phase approach to change. This
model has been mentioned at the beginning of our discussion on change and
involves the three phases of unfreezing, changing and refreezing.
When we reflect on the two models just presented, I believe that these models
have adopted Lewin's approach as an underlying basis for what they want to
achieve. Kanter, Stein and Jick (1992) do mention Lewin's model in their text
and acknowledge its influence on the field of change management. In fact, the
authors reflect critically on it to some extent. Kanter, Stein and Jick (1992), in
the introduction to their book, included the following criticism, "Lewin's model
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was a simple one, with organizational change involving three stages;
unfreezing, changing, refreezing. This quaintly linear and static conception -
the organisation as ice cube - is so wildly inappropriate that it is difficult to see
why it has not only survived but prospered, except for one thing. It offers
managers a very straightforward way of planning their actions, by simplifying
an extraordinarily complex process into a child's formula" ( p. 10).
A certain amount of confusion arises out of the fact that later in their book,
they seem to present a model that, although acknowledging that the change
process is more dynamic than is often depicted by the three phase model, is
almost entirely based on Lewin's approach and often gives reference to the
terminology that he used. For example, let us examine some commentary on
the third commandment, "Disengaging with the past - or pattern breaking - is
critical to the "unfreezing" process which Kurt Lewin described back in 1947"
(Kanter, Stein & Jick, 1992, p.383).
Bringing our discussion back to Dawson's (1994) approach, we find the
following commentary on Lewin's model, "Although this theory has proven to
be useful in understanding planned change under relatively stable conditions,
with the continuing and dynamic nature of change in today's business world, it
no longer makes sense to implement a planned process for 'freezing' changed
behaviour" (Dawson, 1994, p.3).
Dawson (1994) has attempted to develop a framework that helps to explain
the process involved in a major change. Towards this end, he has identified
three timeframes that are involved in a change process. These include:
• Conception of a need to change
• Process of organizational transition
• Operation of new work practices and procedures.
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Added to this are what he calls the "major determinants of change" (Dawson,
1994, p.41). The three that Dawson has developed are:
1. The substance of change
2. The politics of change
3. The context of change
According to Dawson (1994), the substance of change refers to the type and
scale of change. Dawson (1994) poses the following question with regard to
the substance of change, "... what are the characteristics of the changes
being introduced and how do they enable or constrain the options open to
management during the introduction of a major change programme?" (p.42).
The politics of change is referred to as the processes of consultation, conflict
and resistance. These pressures can come from both inside and outside the
organisation and are wrapped up in the lobbying for power and influence over
decision making (Dawson, 1994).
The context of change refers to both the internal and external environments of
the organisation. It also refers not only to the current environment but also the
past. Dawson lists the five major internal contextual factors as, "human
resources; administrative structures; technology; product or service; and
history and culture" (Dawson, 1994, p.42).
The understanding that emerges from reading this text is that Dawson's
(1994) framework is designed as an analytical tool, which helps to explain the
processes involved in a major-scale organisational transition. Dawson
stresses the notion that change is a very temporal process and, in the bigger
picture, one could say the supra-system, the change process that an
organisation has just been through is simply part of a wider and on-going
process of change. Dawson describes changes as a dynamic and ever
changing processes (Dawson, 1994).
In fact, Dawson (1994) adds to the framework described above by saying that
the processual approach recognises that change occurs within and alongside
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a change program. We read, "Apart from its analytical and explanatory value
in particular cases, the processual approach also sensitizes us to the fact that
there are no fixed outcomes of change under a given... system, simply
outcomes at particular moments in time" (Clark in Dawson, 1994, p.45).
Dawson's framework is presented diagrammatically in figure 6 below:






















(Dawson, 1996, p.44) "" " "
In summary, Dawson's (1994) framework describes the change process as
beginning with a period of time when the idea that change is needed is birthed
within an organisation. Following on from here, a decision is usually taken by
senior management on whether to invest in a major change program. If the
decision is taken and the organisation begins with a change program, then a
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time period of implementation occurs. This includes buying equipment,
possibly a new technology, hiring external consultants if necessary and
moving into the full-scale implementation of whatever change program has
been decided upon. The final period is where new operating practices begin to
emerge as the norm. It is noteworthy that Dawson makes particular reference
to the fact that the operating practices becomes the norm within the wider
context of ongoing processes of change (Dawson, 1994).
Interestingly, there is a similarity between Dawson (1994) and Kanter, Stein
and Jick (1992) in that Dawson describes the period of actual transition as a
muddled and confusing process and not something that is smooth and
predictable. Kanter, Stein and Jick (1992) talk about this stage as 'muddling
along1.
One really needs to look further into the manner in which Dawson (1994)
distinguishes his framework from other change models as one could be
forgiven for thinking that there is not really much difference between what
Dawson is saying and what the other models present.
I think the difference is found where Dawson (1994) advocates that the
processual approach does not prescribe a single structure which is the light
on the hill for every transforming organisation. Dawson (1994) puts it this way,
"Change is viewed as an ongoing process which is both progressive and
regressive, is planned and unplanned, and incorporates intended and
unintended innovations from the initial conception of the need to change
through to the emergence of new work arrangement" ( p. 173).
A further distinction that Dawson (1994) makes, as well as a criticism of other
models, is that the processual approach does not characterise change as a
series of rational and linear decisions or activities. In this light, Dawson has
developed two pieces of advice for those involved in change:
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1. It is important to be aware and to maintain an overview of the dynamic and
long-term process of change.
2. The management of organisational transition is unlikely to be marked by a
line of continual improvement from beginning to end. (Dawson, 1994).
In an attempt to give managers a more practical grasp on what Dawson
(1994) is talking about, he has developed a list of 15 guidelines which can be
drawn from the processual approach to managing change. These include the
two piece of advice mentioned above together with the following:
1. Be aware of, and understand the context in which change takes place.
2. Ensure that change strategies are culturally sensitive and do not
underestimate the strength of existing cultures.
3. Consider the value of having a champion of change.
4. Affirm that the substance of change is fully understood.
5. Train staff in the use of new equipment, techniques and procedures.
6. Ensure senior management commitment and support.
7. Develop a committed and cohesive local management team.
8. Ensure that supervisors are part of major change programmes.
9. Gain trade union support.
10. Spend time developing good employee relations.
11. Clearly communicate the intentions of change to employees.
12. Provide appropriate funding arrangements.
13. Take a total organizational approach to managing transition"
(Dawson, 1994, p. 179).
From the above list of rather straightforward guidelines to the management of
change, one must ask the question again, "what is the great difference here?"
Dawson (1994) argues this issue as follows, "No longer is it appropriate to talk
about long-term stability followed by change followed by long-term stability
but, rather, organizational transition should be viewed as an ongoing process
which may develop from partial incremental commitment as well as by the
formulation of corporate strategies for the wholescale introduction of new
organizational structures ... caution should be given to studies which present
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linear models in an attempt to construct commandments of change or to
prescribe the next way to manage organizational change. In short, change
needs to be managed as an ongoing and dynamic process and not as a single
reaction to adverse contingent circumstance " (Dawson, 1994, p. 182).
4.4 Conclusion
In summary, there are a number of models available that prescribe certain
methods of dealing with change and the management of change. I have
presented two that seemingly align themselves with the Lewin-type model and
then a third approach which claims to be addressing the weaknesses of the
current change models with a particular reference to the Lewin based models.
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CHAPTER FIVE: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEARNING
HISTORIES - EXPLAINING THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will present an overview of the research methodology used
for this study. This methodology is called a Learning History. Those that have
been involved in the development of this methodology, mainly Art Kleiner and
George Roth, have produced a number of documents with regards to learning
histories. In these documents, they have placed a heavy emphasis on what is
and what is not a learning history (Kleiner & Roth, 1996).
I have taken a 'learning history approach1 to my research but concede that,
according to Kleiner and Roth (1996), this study would not officially be
classified as a learning history. Therefore, I will present the wider process
involved in a learning history and then explain how I adapted this methodology
to best suit the needs and scope of this particular intervention.
5.2 Learning Histories
Learning histories have developed out of the dilemma that Kleiner and Roth
(1996) saw emerging within the field of organisational learning. Although the
concept had gained a great deal of currency within management circles, the
problem of assessing whether the organisation had actually benefited from the
learning effort was repeatedly appearing (Kleiner & Roth, 1996).
The real problem seemed to be related to people's feelings about and
perceptions of assessment. It seemed that when people felt they were being
assessed, the learning effort was easily compromised. This may come about
from the desire to 'look good1 if you feel you are being assessed. So, what
was lacking from the organisational learning projects Kleiner and Roth (1996)
studied, was a suitable form of feedback to the rest of the organisation. It was
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as a result of these concerns that learning histories were developed (Kleiner &
Roth, 1996).
A learning history document is designed to help organisations become more
aware of the learning that is taking place within its borders. "The learning
history presents the experiences and understandings of participants - people
who initiated, implemented and participated in organisational transformation
efforts..." (Kleiner & Roth, 1996, p.2).
In essence, a learning history is meant to tell the story through the voices of
the people who have been involved in the transformation program. The
developers of the learning history claim that the document is structured in
such a manner that it helps the organisation move forward and distribute the
learnings of one area within the company to the organisation as a whole. "A
learning history thus represents the organisation talking to itself, in a safe and
carefully structured way, about the things it needs to hear but hasn't yet
listened to" (Kleiner & Roth, 1996, p.2).
5.2.1 The Process
A learning history project has been broken into seven distinct stages that one
must travel through. These stages are:
1. Planning: Determining the boundaries
This stage consists of planning and reaching some understanding of the
scope of the project. An important part of this stage is the identification of
"Noticeable Results" - these are important events or processes within the
organisation that everyone, no matter who, would recognise as having
occurred. It also involves the establishment of the learning history team. This
team includes internal and external learning historians.
2. Reflective research: Interviews and data gathering
This is the core of the research within the learning history. The learning
historians gather appropriate data and do reflective interviews with
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participants of the process being researched. It is important, with regards to
the interviews, that a wide enough range of people are interviewed and that a
suitable cross-section of perspectives is included. This must include those that
did not support the effort.
3. Distillation: Establishing key themes and "plots"
From the large amount of data that is sourced within the research phase
(interviews, documents, observations etc) the learning historian has to allow
the emergence of a set of core themes. This process of distillation is important
as it attempts to present some form of meaningful interaction with the large
amount of data produced within the research phase. Kleiner and Roth (1996),
with reference to this phase, talk about balancing the three learning historian
imperatives:
i. The 'research' imperative - keep conclusions rooted in the data
ii. The 'mythic' imperative - to tell an archetypally moving story
iii. The 'pragmatic' imperative - to tell the story in a way that it can be
effectively read, heard and discussed in organisations" (p.8).
4. Writing: Production of a transactional object
The learning history is based on the anthropological concept of a 'jointly told
tale1. "In this form of writing, the participants and the learning historians tell
the story together, incorporating the participants' experience and passion,
along with the learning historians' broader perspective and objective training"
(Kleiner & Roth, 1996, p.8). This is presented in a 'two-column' format. This
will be explained in more detail later.
5. Validation: Reflective feedback
This stage is where the emerging story is checked for validation and
authenticity.
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6. Dissemination: Application and transferring learning
In an attempt to make the learning history as useful a document as possible, it
is not simply handed out to people. The argument is that it would then simply
gather dust with the rest of the unhelpful reports prior to the learning history.
Rather the learning history is interactively presented to the organisation in a
set of carefully designed workshops. These workshops are designed to gain
maximum use and 'learning transfer1 from the learning history.
7. Publication / Outreach
Once the above process is completed, the learning history is presented to a
wider audience, with the organisation's name disguised. This attempts to
make the transfer of knowledge as wide as possible and not limited only to the
organisation itself (Kleiner & Roth, 1996).
In addition to these seven stages of a learning history, the Kleiner and Roth
(1996) have stated that there are a number of generic principles that seem to
be emerging with regard to learning history work. These include:
1. Organisations today have a choice - "Slash and burn" or "Learn".
Learning history work is really based on the idea that organisational learning
is essential for today's rapidly changing business climate. Kleiner and Roth
(1996) state the following, "The alternative to command-and-control is
collaborative learning - the ability to expand an organisation's capabilities in
response to its own desired future and the state of current reality" (p.11).
2. Learning takes place from experience, but collective learning from
experience is inherently problematic.
Learning does take place through experience, but the problem with
organisational learning is that it is often difficult to transfer learning from
individual or even group experiences to the wider organisational environment.
Learning histories are an attempt to overcome this dilemma.
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3. Communication that fosters learning must embody the research,
mythic and pragmatic imperatives.
These imperatives have already been mentioned. What the authors are trying
to say here is that communication that is going to foster learning must cycle
through the different imperatives.
4. No one voice provides "the answer" - people accept other's
viewpoints in the context of their own.
The learning history attempts to create validity through the use of as many
perspectives as possible. This obviously needs to be limited to what is useful.
As mentioned in the beginning of this document, the perspectives of the
people interviewed in this study are valid. They might not tell the whole story
but they do tell what they experienced. In a full-scale learning history project,
the learning historians attempt to create the most accurate picture of the
'whole' story.
5. "You are not alone" - all particular instances are reflections of
universal patterns.
As Argyris and Schon (1978) reported, most of the organisations that they
worked in had a model O-l learning system. It didn't matter what nation,
culture or language. Most had the same learning system. Kleiner and Roth
(1996), who state that certain patterns emerge that are universal, apply this
principle here. Each learning history project and each organisation is unique
but often the underlying patterns that emerge are shared.
6. Organisations "know" what they need to hear but lack the capacity to
listen.
As a whole group, the organisation has an understanding of what the
organisation needs to know. The problem is that organisational memory is
scattered in the lives and experiences of each individual. The learning history
attempts to bring these different experiences together into a combined format
so that the organisation can know more than the individuals within it.
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7. Organisations need an established infrastructure for reflection.
This principle relates to the effectiveness of a learning history. As a one-off
event, it will be limited. Kleiner and Roth (1996) argue that the learning history
will begin to maximise its usefulness and effectiveness when it is linked into
other organisational structures for reflection.
8. Learning involves change, and change may be difficult.
Any learning involves a certain degree of change. This principle simply states
that learning and the change associated with learning can be difficult. The
learning history tries to deal with this issue by gathering as many perspectives
as possible on difficult issues.
9. Stories convey intangibles.
The beauty of a story is that it is able to communicate some of the intangibles
that exist within the organisation. It provides the format and style to tell the
story behind the event.
5.3 The Jointly-Told Tale: A note about the two-column format
Kleiner and Roth (1996) have borrowed this concept of presentation from an
area of research found within the broader field of ethnographic research.
Relying heavily on the work of Van Maanen's (1979, in Kleiner & Roth, 1996)
understanding of ethnographic research, Kleiner and Roth picked up on a very
experimental type of enthography called the Jointly Told Tale. "In these tales,
the subject and the writer interweave the story - either through extensive use
of quotes, often from the same person at various times in the story or through
a give-and-take between quote and commentary or through a carefully edited
narrative in which the writer is barely visible" (Kleiner & Roth, 1996, p.4-1).
Kleiner and Roth (1996) list two types of 'two-column' formats. The first one is
called the 'two-column' format. Its name is very descriptive of what the
documents appearance. The page is divided into two columns with a section
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for "full-text" materials as an introduction to the plot or theme being worked
on.
5.3.1 The Right-Hand Column
This section of the text presents the story from the perspective of the
participants. The actual quotes of what people said are used in this column.
Due to the nature of oral to text-based communication, some of the quotes are
edited to make what the person was trying to say clearer.
5.3.2 The Left-Hand Column
This side of the page is dedicated to research-related comments and analysis
of what is in the right-hand column. It attempts to present some questions and
comments that enable to reader to make more sense of the story in the right-
hand column.
5.3.3 The Full-Text Material
This full-width material is used to introduce the start of each segment and
provides the necessary scaffolding for the reader to understand the context to
such an extent that the story becomes, firstly, accessible and secondly,
understandable. It is noted that care must be taken with this material to make
sure that the reader understands and is adequately introduced to the story to
come, but that evaluative comments on the story are not presented. The
learning history format is presented in this manner so that readers are able to
make up their own minds about the situation. In essence, the readers are
required to make their own assessments about the situation. (Kleiner & Roth,
1996)
5.3.4 The Alternative to two columns: The Staggered Format
Kleiner and Roth (1996) offer another presentation style for use with learning
history work. They have called this the staggered format.
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The staggered format is somewhat similar to what is seen within current
academic writing. The format is also, "more 'linear' - it guides the reader more,
while still distinguishing between the various types of material" (Kleiner &
Roth, 1996, p.4 -13). As opposed to having two columns, the material and the
different perspectives are presented in a staggered approach. Left-aligned
comments will be from the researcher and right-aligned comments from the
participants. The full-width text is the same as in the two-column format.
5.4 The Distillation Process: The Heart of the Data Analysis
I believe that it would be useful to detail further the process that occurs at this
stage. It is where the majority of the data analysis happens and therefore
useful to make this process explicit for the reader.
The distillation process outlined by Kleiner and Roth (1996) is based on a
"grounded theory" process. "Its rigour is designed to ensure that anyone can
organize a mass of material into concepts and theory, without losing the
research validity that emerges from individual's biases" (Kleiner & Roth, 1996,
p. 10-3).
The main concepts used for the data analysis are, open, axial, and selective
coding. The process that I followed for coding is presented below.
5.4.1 First Research Pass: Coding Concepts
Firstly, the basis of the data is the transcribed interviews. The coding therefore
starts with these. This process begins with working through each interview
transcript and developing a list of concepts that emerge from the data. This
process goes beyond simply identifying common areas of interest but
attempts to look further into some of the assumptions and attributions made
by the participants interviewed.
Kleiner and Roth (1996) provide a useful model for the phrasing of these
concepts. They recommend that each concept consist of two parts. The first is
a label that clearly identifies what you are talking about, and the second a
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brief description of what that concept is about. It is also recommended when
labelling to avoid too much inference but rather give descriptions that are true
to the data. This concept labelling process operated at a paragraph level and
tried to limit labels to one per paragraph.
5.4.2 Second Research Pass: Joining Concepts Together
Kleiner and Roth (1996) recommend that this stage is done among the
learning historian team and individual concepts are presented to the group for
discussion and final consensus. Although I can see that this would be a useful
process to go through, I was the only one researching and so this was not
possible.
The second part of the second research pass is a grouping exercise. From the
list of concepts that emerged from the different interviews, I used an "affinity
diagram" to group similar ideas or concepts together
From here, I went through a process of Axial analysis. Again, Kleiner and
Roth (1996) borrow from grounded theory. This analysis is designed to " bring
out the heretofore overlooked aspects of each of these groupings" (Kleiner &
Roth, 1996, p. 10-11). This happens through interrogating each of the
proposed themes with a number of questions. These questions are:
i. What are the correlations of the concepts?
(a) How many times is it mentioned in the text?
(b) Is this concept typical?
ii. Why did it happen?
This stage is underpinned by a technique called "The Five Whys" which
Kleiner and Roth outline (1996, p. 10-14). It is also used to begin some of
the systemic analysis into causal relationships amount the concepts.
iii. What happened next? What did this influence or lead to?
iv. What is the appropriate level of aggregation?
v. What else could it mean?
vi. Where are the taboos?
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Kleiner and Roth (1996) stress the importance of words or phrases like,
"never", "always" and "everyone knows that". These are key words that
flag potential areas that are not "allowed" to be discussed. In other
words, they are what Argyris and Schon (1978) would call an "Open
Secret" (Kleiner & Roth, 1996, Ch 10).
5.4.3 First Mythic Pass: Writing the Story
At this point we have a number of groupings of concepts which are the raw
material for the development of themes. This stage is used for the creation of
those themes.
This stage also includes the writing of the "nut-graf. Kleiner and Roth (1996)
describe it as, "A single paragraph that describes the theme and tells the
story, in a nutshell" (p. 10-18).
5.4.4 A Final Pass
"Research
Are we still true to the data?
Does the theme, as described, in fact feel "grounded" in the data?
Mythic
Have we really gotten to the heart of the matter?
Do you feel that the story has a universal element?
Pragmatic
Have we presented this in a way that people will hear and learn from it?"
(Kleiner & Roth, 1996, p. 10-20).
5.4.5 Sorting
This involved distributing the quotes from each interview into the newly
developed themes. I opened one interview at a time and worked through
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each one, carefully using the coding developed earlier to identify which quotes
fit into the different themes.
5.5 Adaptation of the Research Process
As I mentioned in the beginning chapter, this study is a pilot study and
therefore does not encompass the full requirements that Kleiner and Roth
(1996) state in terms of a learning history. To clarify this issue, I said earlier
that I have taken a learning history approach. In essence, this means that the
way I undertook the research is in line with what happens in learning history
projects, but adaptations were necessary due to time and resource
constraints.
Looking over the seven stages outlined by Kleiner and Roth, I can say that I
completed all but two of them. The stages that were not completed, or not fully
completed were "Validation" and "Dissemination".
In terms of validation, I was able to have the transcribed interviews checked
with one person only. Again, time and resource issues complicated this
process and so I could not validate the rest of the interviews with the people
concerned.
With regard to dissemination, the very nature of this type of study does not
allow for this type of dissemination to happen. I chose the university as a case
study for this research, it was not the university who commissioned the
research and as such the workshops associated with this stage were not
feasible.
Although this is not an adaptation to what Kleiner and Roth (1996) outline for
learning histories, it must be noted at this point that due to the limited data
collected, roughly 120 pages of transcribed interviews plus other documents, I
have decided to present the learning history in the staggered format. I do not
believe that I have enough material, or a wide enough range of stakeholders,
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to facilitate a meaningful story with the two-column format. As mentioned
above, the staggered approach is more guided for the reader and will better
suit the amount of data I have collected and the themes that I want to
concentrate on within the next chapter.
Furthering this point, there will be stages throughout the next chapter where I
will include analysis and commentary that is more suitable to this type of
academic document compared to that of a learning history. Although this can
be likened to the role of the left-hand column, I will be making more overt
analysis of the data as opposed to simply presenting questions that challenge
the reader to make his or her own conclusions. I will also, on occasion,
include diagrams and systems maps as appropriate.
In addition to this, I will be making some recommendations as a result of this
research. Due to the nature of this type of document, it would not be
appropriate to simply leave the process open-ended. Therefore, I will attempt
to draw out the areas of learning that I believe would be useful for the
university to take note of as a result of this implementation. This could also
take the form of recommendations for future research.
In making the adaptations or exclusions mentioned above explicit, I
acknowledge that the learning history purists would dismiss this as not
qualifying for such a title. At the same time, this document does present to the
reader a certain perspective of what happened and what can be learnt out of
the implementation of Banner. So I would like to make the claim that it is a
type of learning history, albeit one that Kleiner and Roth (1996) would not put
their label to.
5.6 Overview of Research
As outlined in the general process of a learning history above, the majority of
my research has been reflective interviews. Interviews were carried out with
15 participants from a range of stakeholders. These included:
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♦ Deans and Heads of Schools
♦ Members of the Banner implementation team
♦ Members of the Banner executive committee
♦ Members of the S!MS Action Group
♦ Faculty Officers
♦ Admission Officers
♦ Senior Academic staff in various departments
♦ Staff from the Information Systems department.
♦ The Project Manager
In addition to the interviews, I gained access to a large number of documents
within the Banner Office. These included minutes of meetings, communication
between the university and SCT, Banner newsletters, training schedules,
various letters of complaint from users to the Banner Office, screen prints of a
range of reports available on Banner, and general other documentation
regarding the implementation process. The data that has emerged from this
interview process and document analysis will be presented in the next
chapter.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter has presented an overview of the research process in a learning
history and the adaptation of that process that I have implemented within this
study. The chapter also included the generic principles that have come to be
associated with learning histories.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE BANNER IMPLEMENTATION - A
LEARNING HISTORY
6.1 Introduction
On March 31 1993 the University of Natal purchased the Banner Student
Information and Financial Aid Systems. The Banner system was implemented
over the next eighteen months and went "live" for registration of students in
1995. The project was implemented on time and within budget. About
1997/1998, a decision was taken to stop any further upgrades of the Banner
system, indicating a move away from Banner and towards another system.
This process was completed with the current (2000) implementation of the
Integrated Tertiary Software (ITS) system at the university.
What happened with the Banner project and why? Some have called it a
huge success, while others have cried out in angst at the money wasted
through this process. Whatever the case may be, this document is not
concerned with placing blame, but rather with finding what can be learnt from
the implementation.
Sidebar - The Learning History Format
AH full width text in this document is commentary from the researcher and will
be provided to keep the story flowing. This will also allow for some analysis
appropriate to this type of document.
The text that is left-aligned comprises critical questions and commentary from
the research, while the text that is right-aligned will be actual quotes from the
participants.
6.2 Theme One - Why Banner?
In 1992, the University of Natal was operating with the Student Information
Management System (SIMS). The SIMS system was a "homegrown" system
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which was reaching the end of its life. The system was, as we will hear
shortly, beginning to crumble and needed to be replaced. Most, if not all
people were in agreement with this. The challenge for the university was to
decide which system was most suitable. Let's look at how this process
unfolded.
6.2.1 Some History
The following section will attempt to retell the sequence of events leading up
to a decision.






.system,. it ■hacl-be©rr'developed over theyears, if
.■I .remember rightly,7It was i&ryeiy based or,
COBOL. It was "unable" to be maintained, it was
crumbling." and a rv-;w' .system :was absolutely;
necessary, lhe.-prGbJ.efri was which system.' ■ 7
Well, -yes, in a post facto/! mean, I; explored thai
(■think tlMv-ufiiversity;had- -2 r-om.egrown system
prior to that, SliVi-S, Students information
Management ■ System, I tfiinK. 'That had dimply
outgrown 'its.,usefulness/" 1 me&riM wasy-as were
many .home-grown systems, justiaking'too 'much
iso a
mainframe-basecs nw:bin«, '&■•& c!._1 JBM 380. 1
think it was, and they war©' Going to: scrap that.
Urn, ti
up to.date, offered more functionality ■'■■. '. '.:
i can.tell you the sequence':of:events..". What
happened. Totally wrong sequence of events.
What happened ' was, -we -were' on' a' .system
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I called SIMS. SIMS was designed by the
..:.... " university for the university,' And if was-working
Is;ihm.valid in terms of thelfirm but it was very limited- and ras.-IT grew, we
;»y or a nc
human 'response ■ to \ know, to 'give us facilities, ■ to ■ get more
change? | information out'of .it. So, 'the. university decided
I toirwesllgite;.'-. ■ - '' '
i Urn. it was being done in stages, so there was
| human reco ii • ■. .here
;. At
■ j that time,. I "was the ... In Durban. The whole
; student systems.same uncfei my responsibility.
[■So, the jiTipierftentatfon process was ongoing at
j the time.:--: The-Integrated Tertiary-Systems (ITS)
f■ program tiacl gone.: through ."Human- resources,
man
1 resources,.. And then, it -/as sorfof- our turn. We
•r the
j University of Natal? Univeirsities are unique
lulti-
3wn
| ■"-.'■■ ■■. * !
| rules' and -'regulations .and nee(k> and reports. I
j The idea, is to son if the'SIS .system was j
! appropriate and we did a lot of work, probably I









[ What changes were I. background. :it was introduced--in an-Afrikaans-1
I needed to the Afrikaans-] speaking institution.''But to^bring-tfiat-system into I
I based system that proved j a sort of liberal English, white university, there |
I !
I so- much bigger than the i-.-wasn't-a;-fit -there. The ientiinoioqy and the I
. : ■■■■■:;.: : j . . ■ ,
\ American ' system? How .changes- would.have been'enormous. |
ths i : ... itii I?
Thus the context begins to develop. Seemingly people having a greater
understanding of the technological issues were in agreement that a new
system was necessary, if not essential. A question to ponder would be
whether this was communicated to all key users? Nel (1996) lists a number of
human responses to change. The first two are "Old Contentment" and
"Denial". The first is concerned with the fact that most people do not see the
need for change and the second response is that people will deny the
relevance of information regarding change. So, in response to the above
question, a useful follow-on would be, How well were the human responses to
change engaged within this process? Possibly an assumption operating at
this point was that if you "communicate" the correct information, people will
understand and accept it.
The stage is now set. All that remains is to see how the process unfolded.
How did the university get to the point of choosing Banner as the most
appropriate system for the University of Natal?
... '.you coukl clei two things:■■ you 'could either
■change the' system or char^fi ths way vvo do
work. And changing the way we do work is
extremely difficult in a university environment. I
Some of the.changes---we.have .aehieved/Bver the j
years, but it was extremely difficult, so the idea I
was, if we reject ITS, what is if that we neexi? So j
we undertook anolher sort of survey, went to the
USA, looked.at.various systems, 'and' at the end !
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at the
requirements- tor this new
;j ;- n?
Some confusion . ■arises







we should take Banner So, that's'how we got to
very
V' "•-•■'. - i ivinu *#-. ■ "• -ision
that \a take
Banner.
?fJ5! i I. It
would have to be able to...let me put it another |
cson't ; I > iy knevt w tat it |
wanted .af the time except a new: .system, Uh,
part of what we had to do was to try: and decide !
what tha-actual needs'were and,! think-right early
.in the'beginning, ws rnadeiiie decision that we |
did not have the 'capability to', write, another in-1
house system Uh, that was a point that .-/as |
argued, it was certainly argued, .and.'we shouid j
write an in-house system, but, uh, we definitely !
were of .the. point of view that we'citiave to go for!
•r a
corniiiercial system, then the question is uh: we \
had our requirements, but we'd -haveW settle for I
a leve! of match 10 our requireme.rits ... 'based on j
what was available.
iiyvas actually not the perfect, process' by any |
means. If was. an historic: process that j










'student affairs. • section, .'computer services
division (C8.D), which is:. our information
had
asked, well' everybody agreed- that a new system
was needed, but. to try and specify that system,
very
hard thing to do.
A sim :ier to
see if Banner w> i that
'as isa ■ .i ••- " •• •' civ. ill •■ snt to
thai
system.- Different types ofin:stituli.or!s,.we had a




system, to show peopje. how it works, etc. And
. ■ ■ i
did very practical, hands on stuff. We were abie |
to say is this'the..system you wart' to- go with and [
the answer was yes, that was the system
Ho, they weren't {users consulted). They v/ere j
ned
andilien we we're cartvassed.. Arid-we said we J
i to
.SIMS, we' don't want Elanner. But they'd already j
signed, but, of course, then .wheir they decided I
' •' ■• " '■ ,- < ■ • ■ • ''da
us
vhat we're getting.




process is ; always done
of a
wider system The. supra-
system .begins to exert
wasn't. Only the training,that they" ."buf alilar
•ss CDnsu-faison. them.was- nothing.' .
Well,, when we/enquired about ■•that, -they said to
us that they bad, they did some time ago, long |
before Banner was signed and seated, they I
asked ; all the' users questions from' all the |
faculties,■ They asked them questions.on what I
the system does and v/har thsy would like it to do I
etc. And based on trial, I think they then !oo!<ed I
at 'Banner and they decided on-Banner, ■•
"c mentioned ihls, and if go! to-a'certain person's |
knowledge that I was doing this. That person |
phoned me and said we're jus! going overseas to !
talk to the Banner people, have you got some ;
questions thai you could- give' me'to ask them I
about the student records systems. And during |
my -discussion with'that person; at that'time, I |
found to my horror that the group of people who I
v/ere deciding to buv Banner had nsvec dons a I
user requirement specification. And tfiat they
were actually going to buy the system without
knowing what the users required. Urn, I sasd to
this person, cancel your trip now, don't waste the
university's money, don't leiave the country, don't
go. Do trie requirements first, then you know
what to ask. ' ■ ■ ' -I
Uh, we had a fairly large Banner committee,
steering corri.--nlti.ee which, well, if became a j
Banner steering committee, but there was a |
committee that was in charge of the job and j
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deciding what system- to go lor;"""' And ~ that -had
wide representation, academic representation; it
3!rs, it
.-had.-computer services, it had-finance,.and it had |
management information people' on it and we I
simpiy fought out what, we should go for on that I
■committee, I can say that the ■■situation was fairly j
desperate by the time I gotthere;-..No decision !
i a
deadline in the sense of the computers that, were j
running the old system were.at the-'end of.their I
life. They could have coflapsecf at any minute!
and we didrr'f have time to spend going oui to I
the grass roots, go consulting people. But there I
was this representative team which made the I
decision to go for Banner. ' ivpnusisay it was I
made, .it was pushed by ne and one or two j
others from above, quite hard, to snake, you I
"-' l ' • ■ yfia pt to make a
.decision. You may be .making the wrong •■decision I
or the right ■decision, but you .earft procrastinate j
anymore so we!ve pot to make this decision, I
This is the information that we've got, that we'd |
gathered over several years, there were volumes I
of it. tut. uri it had f;o be made on the basis oi i
some incomplete ^formation, J think is always |
the case, in that sort of thing,-
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Figure 7: The Decision-Making Context
Banner Steering Committee:
A certain degree of "faction"
fighting. Problems associated










As the decision-making context becomes clearer, we are able to see some of
the processes and pressures that were on the team to choose a system.
Would it have been cheaper and more effective, in the long run, to complete a
user requirements specification than to have made a decision without this
information? One has to ask, just how did the university come to the point of
deciding on Banner? What information formed the basis of that decision?
Some thoughts of the participants follow.
of
limited and plays a role in I One, do we go for urn, do we write the in-house
deciding system? And wq workshopped that extensively. I
Then It was a case of identifying systems that I
were offered That was actually a hard thing to '
I do, 'cause there weren't very many. And we I
r, as-fie-one otitsj.Gf©the.cGOfilry, I
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and other thanJhai, a few-'iivhbuse
. '.- - - : Inai had been written by other universities which
j . .. ■ ■ ":" ■ . i we might h&vo boan able to modify to c&9> with
■ ..': ■. .- ■ :: '■ .mjrselv-es. .So,'when you--say, specifying a
! How-. was this schievndV ; system, \vt didn't'have many'options,' Uh.it was
How would the ww&rsiiy j a case of seeing what was available and seeing
| Know what hesf- suited I what came closer- to,' ciosesf to what'would serve
the:
\ were not established? I
\Ai ■ • •• ' l« knuw --and f cars'i , - . .-•
i Impi
| ^B/7^ ! i • 'fJtio fed ! i j, pposecM !1"S . :
I syste/?? divorced from j stage we were thinking about using WITS (The |
decision n . . .
"shl - ■—--• | Rand ri! <n rsivsrs .) ivp. ,. :• ,. ]ut I
. -.. .-.■■. ; . : I don't know what prompted-them;, they-went .over |
. ■. ■ -. . ■-■ ' ] to. America and they had.-a-'Jook'-attfe. system I
1 and they came back and said its good So, I was !
. : : '■ '. actually in the stage, after that.-. ' '■ j
I ' ' ' v- !l
| went to the USA to \ wouldn't say thai they'd done a proper user |
inve t!' " -- In ■ maiy* m uh, i !PPo e .- K -
■: ; : -. ■ ..-. ;■ •■■ .■- ■ .,;■ ■ r-could- rsporf; rTiaintairi ther student records-and |
char-ge their fees and do reasonable amount of j
reporting and that you know That's probably, but |
N don't mir^ he besi rscr , ... . . . .!
Characteristics of Mode! j question, because i wasn't sort of at the level !
O-i learning systems, j where you know ihm/ made all those policy
Pmieci seif andolhem j deasfons and that. Urn; you know I
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unilat " they'd
■•' " ' ■ '■■ j served our needs as good as before and ... ■ :
The report written on the | "As this report is being written after the decision
tip to America does j to acquire Banner systems for the University of |
substantiate the position in ! Natal, the sub-sections headed "implications for I
[ the ia$i quote in as much j trie University of Natal" indicate matters which [
as it was written after the \ should be noted wtfh regard to implementation of |
! decision to tak&B'anner. | the ■systems" (Sertototti, 1993V. p. 1).\ ' ■ |
j The de&ision for Banner j .
\ made before-report on visit \' ' " ; j
| wiftfmL Was the visit to I. ' ' . ■ ■ I
Ame;1r:n for purposes j f have no idea. ; just honestly, iioner#/ fc>eiieve it I
| beyond m:
\dec I
■■. • . ■ ..-. {Banner isecause they "didn't do the user |
I . . • : ..■ : ■; . .■■ j requirements 'specification. . \i they'd -gone I
I through the proper systems cfcvstopmenl i
! \ ■■■■.■'■■■■'■'
lifecycle that we use and teach in our discipline, |
if they'd done ihaf, they wcuui have reafeed that I
\ls the smu -■ . | die wei oin ; Vn ; :- .,, : , ;
"They're using we must be | seemed to, from what ( understood, they did if, |
\able . ■
| the decision-mating I coufci use it ! think i! was: some■decision like I
\proc I that, but I can't am I
I With regards to (South j No, I don't think if was ever promised because, j
African Posf^Seconcfary I mean, its obviously a unique system, there's no j
Education) SAPSE I comparable system of reporting. I really have no j
statutory -reporting' to me j idea of what, went through .the niincfe of those |





offs 'will have' to. he taken.
Was this ;;,-? acceptable
mm? ■. !
traded ease of use 'and the- greater functionality"
st the
'fact that Ihoy had to develop SAP8E 'reporting.
The decision to take Banner seems to be surrounded by a lack of foundational
information on which to base such a decision. In repeated attempts to locate
any user specifications requirements, I found nothing. This is not to say that
they do not exist, I just couldn't find them. Some people, quoted above, are of
the opinion that it was never done prior to the decision to take Banner.
If this is the case, was there an overall university strategy with regards to the
Banner system specifically and the institutions technology more generally?
Some insight is given below.
I Evidence of a-.vision'with]
regi to ner \
I Resource 'ailocaiion sited I
I :
| as a reason for failure.
I Does:this. me&riitwili work 1
in tl
Diet the university .have the I
required infrastructure to \
begin' wiih^ to' implement]
such:a vision? . ". . [:
Possible evidence .of the. I
A system which was neveFactually
I because the -university.never:pyt -the resources
| into i
| a system which was basically a form based
system, to star? off with-,;becoming, something I
that was an automatic student information |
system and available to students. S moan, I
■looked at'the system, working on campuses in
the' United States, where' in-fact students, simply
weni online and did their registrations I
themselves. They looked at the rules, they filled !
'in .the courses, they were controiled'rn'terms.:of |
what.they couic! do, but fhey'fiffecl. in ;.h« form?, i
We never goi to that stags. But one had a vision I
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j supm-sysienfs . ability.. to [of moving towatcfe: this where there was'a' 'fairly
I accommodate "change"']- automatic process .of keeping, records'where on©
| but resist any fundamental j would not he^rarwoliecf.as one still is by bits of
i change • in operating |.paper..moving.-left.'-right and centre. And it was
I procedures,:. Mental [ ;certa!niy not what happened-ift the end with the
mo;
.jces
[with re* ■ ■ <
proc . i
| ih& change process I ■ ■ I
engaged with? . ■ \ . ■ • . ' ■- I
From the results that are emerging from this pilot study, it is evident that the
decision-making process with regards to choosing Banner was somewhat
flawed. It has been established that there was some inconsistency with
regards to the information used to decide on Banner. Some stated that the
information was there, although I was not able to find it, while others
advocated that the user specifications requirements was not done prior to
purchase, or even implementation.
6.3 Conclusion
This chapter has provided some insight into the processes leading up to the
decision to take Banner. It has been established to some extent that this
process was flawed and a certain amount of inconsistency exists with regards
to the information used to make this decision.
117
CHAPTER SEVEN: THEME TWO: WIDER BANNER SYSTEM
7.1 Introduction
I have chosen to call the next theme the "Wider Banner System" as it best
describes the contents. This theme includes the technical implementation
process and project management of that process. It also includes, and hence
the name, the other systems that were set up under the "Wider Banner
System". These include the Banner Office and reasons for the new ITS
system, or stated differently, why Banner was replaced.
The decision has been taken, Banner is on its way. The only thing left to see
is how did it all piay out? How was this system that we just learnt about in the
last theme actually get implemented at the University of Natal?
7.2 Project Management
A decision was taken by the Banner Executive Committee (BEC) to appoint
an external project manager. There was a time limit of eighteen months for the
implementation and a team, which was lead by the project manager, was
developed called the Banner Implementation Team (BIT).
| External Project ^/vger j y\feli, ~l ihFk>i& i
seen as the . . .
| app
| sense that we said we have to have an external
| project manager, we appointed Q-Data after
looking at a number of proposals. ... was the |
project manager appointed from a selection !
| process that involved them offering us a number j
of different project managers and our!
| interviewing them and deciding who would be !
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<e of




"Toil people the fads, (rain
them, in' new procedures




■ '' ' M . , ;. , ;
hampered by lack of
earlier processes, '
Evidence of p
the most appropriate, ft was'then .earned"trirougK"
and £ . ik, of
course with all these things, ilwe were problems
along.. f.he .way. There is-:always a problem with.
■ staff
they
were goinsg to have to make sorne changes h©re.
Banner or any.other system woiiid not do things
I ri ■' h '31 ■.••,.;•,..•,..-;..„. „ _ Ancj
ures,
done
by a hi h . one
iif--sr.Q io idui • kif. ij pro? . :.^ving |
n on
board.
Appalling. Trie project •fnariageirient process !
was hampered as a result of the incomplete j
Banner evaluation In addition, ii; ciicfrrt !
and
- ■ ' :—•'■/.' ' ■• hei s, we I
commended them for achieving project |
I i Hi ■ '• , r. jitfi j] j, H ;, , -;es_
■Airight. There was no forma! userneeds analysis |
and so there were all sorts of unmet I
expectations .because -it •wasn't ever j
documented, individual people had different j
so
we're not sure whether the system's actually !
3 n'ng ! , th it.
pem; orked
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[ theories-in-use operating, [-.-very, well But the-; "-university, is not an''easy'
I ii could be that these am I environment, major systems implementation is
| untested assumptions j riot easy -anywhere -but vvith.n & university' it is a
| operating as., facts, In a particularly difficult-environment.I-mean, every
j sense,' thoughts-creating a | one-is an .-.expert/and .nobody is going to give art
reality. '. ■ \ \ ■ ■ - .
■ :' ■ ■■■■■;■■■■■■ '■■ reason to doubt the competence of th© Project
| ■ ; j Manager,:
[ Clear indication of a 1. Definitely.,. Arid .it .was aiso ■ a very, good thing
i limited teaming system in \ bringing him in as;an oCitside: person... Because I
| operation The internal | then he dkJn'i know about the inlornal politics so
I poiiiiai, "fshould ! speak to | he efidnt lie just, not rushed in, </•< J urn he didn't!
I i .- '. ■■-. • . ,. ' ■ ■ - •■• , . . .,' . , • - :. (tor I
j cdlutfe with the system to I ,. hejuyt did It '- ; ' ■ ' I




Proj iiy? I 3J-ect
I .■ ' ■ .'. .{impfementatiori. was' done' in. terms of 'what was |
Time and
i • my
I VJf •■ '": ■■' .--.■■ fi ji pi i .,it8'sif n of j
. . '■; ■. ■ .-■■.- ) a project ■ We-had. an ■outside ''censuliart who |
. ; '.. . J was an expert a> this whole process who went!
i through the stages and actually had workshops i
Communication was very \ in terms of project irnpietTientation. He was a I
i7flp0/tafl- | very good PR (Pubte Relations) person and |
made excsitent contact with th© academic!
I community with admin people!, within users arid j
| the ooiTtiTiufisty in general So that \¥as, you |




I bid Banner need to be j that's a resuit of some discussions that we had, j
| done "better" or "took I looking at some of the oiler projects in the j
I better" than other system - long delays, for different reasons,
| projects? . 1
| What consideration was I No, he was very good, arid he kept a tight reign |
I given to issues emerging j on the .project made sure that if a thing had to
\ within implementation?'\ be done according to our. plan, ••it was.-done. .- ■
I Thh . !
in the work hrorMck.wi >. I
I
structure. ■■'■■!■ I
j Weii. ihfty got it in on um ■■■ ■ '•• *;p,\ ■< \ .j
.. ' | happy with it You know, i wasn't so happy wiih j
I ■ . ' ■■.'■■■■.■' ■;-■' I the way ■■■some; of the-.thin.gs were, clone. It was a |
■■ . ■ •.-■■; I package and they didn't vvaru to chsncjs rhat!
■■.. j. much, they would-often make 'you ■me' fields for I
two i its . ■, jv, instead ' | a
: - ;' -|.separate-field for each set of.data,.'you'd have to |
I coHi&ine '&\ m s and u f,ne sar- field. And j
How were the p ' j
bou . :
| was responsible for the | iriforrTiatiDn; side.-so -! -felt that our requests were I
| MIBS pmjeci? How was ii I not being taken into account. And they "were |
me?.
las a system? MVIanagernent Information on Banner System i
I Did the BIT take this into | (MSBS) pfojecf. But they got it in on lime and |
! ■ ski&iation? they, you know th : • - *rm -: ■ • |
Agaitt. the question' oi j There was'a tendency to deaefe who they were I
boundaries is higNighled j going to listen 1.0 and what they w&erfi going to j
1 listen to and you know bulldoze something
! through and just get ii in on timo and ihafs it you
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know, nobody else might agree with that.
The project management of the implementation of the Banner system seems
to have drawn different responses from different people. From my
perspective, I think the project was extremely focused and the main points of
focus were time and budget. This has both advantages and disadvantages.
Some of these were brought out in the above commentary.
The one area that does seem to be lacking with regard to the project
management was the area of change management. From what I have
gathered, the major techniques used to cope with change were
communication and training. It is not clear that a "sense of urgency" (Kotter,
1996) or a "burning platform" (Nel, 1996) was ever created. Therefore the
need for change was never felt. Without this sense of urgency, the normal
human responses to change begin to take effect and the change process
becomes even more difficult. The change leader is responsible for this. From
the documentation, it is evident that the crumbling technology was a suitable
"burning platform". It was apparent to those that had access to the information
that the technology could collapse "at any moment".
7.3 Banner Office
The Banner Office was established originally as a location on campus where
the BIT could be housed. It subsequently became the home of the support
staff once the Banner Implementation was completed. It is an interesting part






we learn from this?
How did the Banner Office
work?
Issues of P> and
Infon









immediate reports. ' ■
us ... And wa were naughty, we spoiled them,
you knows we didn't.say■ look- go and try on with
g we
Then
the n ■ I'd go
i said
sorry, I might as we!' do it for ..you. That was not j
iore
lifl •- ■:- j 3.
.-■Yeah, no they could because there were reports, I
ioca! written reports.in Banner; which if the dean I
wanted to know how many students were 1
•■■■■■■ • he1. ■ . -ne. I
And then reports, that 'Weren't. written, if the j
faculties or the adnun staff couldn't run them, I
ney ,?d ti end , s-','i •.• . iti ! h?.d to
write a quick Sequel or we'.'had-one'which gave I
them what they wanted, -
Because ... and I used to- writs the quick and |
dirty' reports, because, it wasloo much time to I
wait, put it in the queue for !TD (Infonnaiion I
Ted ifiology Division) to write it and put it on the 1
menu. So we just' did if one'off quickly. Because I
typical usersr they'd come in and say I want this i
report yesterday and they couldrti wait for it to !
go through the normal processes.''
Yes, (there were some reports that cou.'d have I
.'j to
- - - • : .16 I |
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I ■'..■■■ [-mean :,. -and i;'we'Wrote, the 'reports,-w^ should
! it's not just technology.. |-..have.thenmaybe-sentifi^'m.up.to'ITD-and-asked
"Hu ' • enu.
j Banner, at UND, goes-well [.Bui iFistsaeiws. didn't, we forgot, or we'had other
i beyond the ' computer \ things to do. And users,.we didn't mind, they just
I system. Any -inefficiencies, j -carne' -and .phone and .f'iil in a request sheet and
| which may.have/t&laied'to |.we. would run it for them '■ ' ' ' I
the "non-technical" 1 I
■.-.'■■ |
| elements of the system, j '
) can very easity be blamed . :•'■.■ I
I ontb m a k <lsyt te, <\ \
it was .used '.as a basic rTianagernent information j
too! in terms of providing the■'standard'reports for j
exams and, things like that, but i! was never' j
developed as it should have De-en, it simply I
didn't operate that way becsuss-ifyou .wanted to j
get any information out of it, the Banner Office j
didn't have--the capacity to write -fife:reports to j
the
time you got it, the inforrnation wasn't any us«3 to
you.
Raises the issue of






They'd' put you on the wa!ting.,list,.pHon;e them up I
in six weeks-time,, sorry we ■haven'ttiad time to
touch thai yet... Then people start losing it
because they can't get the-.information they)
need.
would expect, a dean or anyone like that would
>d for
that,
because at. that stage they were simply not
staffed'as we'd recommended., thai they should
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i What about looking at the j'be-staffed. 'And they cJidnThave the ■capacity,.,
| system created for j So they would usually have to say, you'll go on a
i Banner? is this the most [ waiting Jisl if miahi 'so. you rnight-get" it. in a
>nt syt
Technology, in a sense, j reports that v?e've got,
I will always be iimit&d to}* ...'■. ' ■■,■'






Facu- i key j
players in this system, j
One •: were !
the en. '■■ i$&n ?s 0/1
emerge. \
ffs.a- hell of .a pain for the;feqoffy-.peopte' aricJattilV j
they stiff couldn't give iii€> thc9 information stbout j
'sups/ That wasn't in the syslern,.cikay,. Urn, but |
it just fneanf an extra link in ffie chain. The |
\vhoff3 concept of technology is: that you - you; do I
it in your office where yciuTieed iv, you don't have [
to go and ask. somebody else/.to do 11 fbr you., it I
just wasn't using the technology as technology I
■can be used. The whote .concept of .that, |
workstations, PC's, databases, is that you can do !
it, okay, you pm in your'/passworcls, you put in j
your protection, and you can do it, it's your data, |
, it's your -students, ifs-"your. exarn,' It's your J
marks, why do you Slave to 'give your marks to |
the faculty office for them to put in?
Just
themselves ■ powerful, because we ■■couldn't get
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No: just power and
ownership hut dependency
as we//.
Dependency created . by i
system, hawing a negate I
influence on data and j
system ownership, which j
in t
influence on data integrity. \
any "information" without going through them.
You know, it was implemented so far., the
training didn't go-far enough,.-so. we didn't create
■power users or. expert partners .whatever you
want' to 'call 'them'... a .cohort ei- people who
really fcriew what was 'going on.' Uh, tn ino end a
o! - ■■ • • - •• ■: i upon h people ...
dependenc-e' built up between some of the key
"users, say faculty' offifiers,, urn, and the"'small
staff in the-Banner office.- ■ ■ ' '' ■
^ Ownership invested "in-a srriarteam/the.bottom I
line is trial; too few peopie knew what wsts realty j
.going on. "And faculties, '.the users ?nd owners of
the data never took ownersfi.ip. So you know j
.another. fiaw\was; .-as we -discover'now, vvas j
integrity and qushty of-the data There's not a |
great d©s! of-.emphasis., on audiffiig...or taking 1
responsibility for qualify of data. Urn, and so !
there was an ongoing tension between the role j
of information technology division, the Banner j
Office, and what ife user should be doing to? I
themselves. ' .■"■..
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\ Both, the-■ users and. the-\ ■¥&$,. and Mefiiy chbice^u kncSiiReylfThey"
j Banner Office had to | pot on with m% Banner office, toat was hie,
colh
I opt




| Ja} so ■ the- Banner'Office;mode! was not a good
I one, because the system, nobody really had an
( overview of the' wtio!e:.system either-. Far too few I
people. } hey also had no idea what was in those !
; reports, they just took -them; at faceAvalue. And |
| asked .... they'd articulated as. best th^y-csbulti a |
| need, and somebody had vviitten something that j
I generated-a -neat-teoking •.report,; They .had; no 1
I idea whether it was" actually •••generatirig what
I they were looking for. And they had no idea of I
1 how that was Uf3cjatsd etc. So that was a serious |
j. problem. ' . .■ ■■" -■ : :
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Lack of Global View
From what is emerging from the pilot study, the Banner Office Model was
problematic. The system that was created through the setting up of the
Banner Office had some emergent properties that were unexpected and
inefficient, such as dependency and lack of data integrity. This is seen in the
causal loop diagram above.
In addition to this, I would argue that the naming of the support office as the
"Banner Office" created some unexpected outcomes. This is with particular
reference to change. I would argue that the people who were working in the
Banner Office would have become very personally affiliated to the Banner
system. The naming of the office created a whole sense of identity for those
people with Banner.
When critical reflection was needed to see if the Banner system was providing
the university with what they desired from a student information system, it
would have been natural for the people in this office to become defensive and
resist any changes necessary. Obviously, when you work on a project and
invest time and effort into its implementation, you do become attached to it in
some manner.
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On the other hand, I would argue that if the Banner Office was called the
student information office, then the focus would have been on providing the
best information system, and not having to defend a certain product.
Furthering this point, I believe it would be difficult for the people in the Banner
Office to take ownership of the new system when so much of their identity is
wrapped up in a particular product. From what I understand the office is still
called the Banner Office. 1 find this quite an amazing statement of a!!egiance
and a very practical display of a human response to change. Is there going to
be a separate ITS office to support the new system or will it be supported by
the Banner Office?
As a final comment on this issue, 1 believe that this strong allegiance to
Banner wou!d have had a strong influence on perceptions of the capability of
the new system. Perceptions that could have far reaching implications in the
future.
Although the Banner Office attempted to satisfy the needs and demands of
the users and was initially set up to support and expand the Banner system, it
seemed to be under-resourced and had the capacity only to maintain the
system. It should be noted at this stage that the number of reports that could
be generated from Banner did increase and, towards the end of Banner's life
at UND, there were a large number of reports available. This does show some
expansion on the side of the Banner system. The lack of expansion that I am
talking about here has to do more with the initial university vision for Banner
and the lack of resources supplied to Banner once the technical
implementation was completed,
Other areas included in the Wider Banner System were the Departmental
System and the other non-Banner systems operating within the university that
Banner had to interface with. I am mentioning them here simply to illustrate
how large the Banner system in total really was. My research did not focus on
these areas and the participants gave very little comment about them. The
major issues mentioned with regard to these other systems included
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frustration in not having direct access to Banner, especially in terms of
interrogating data within the database and secondly the problems associated
with the interface system between Banner and the financial systems.
7.4 Reasons for a New System
I have chosen to include this section here as some of the implications
emerging above have influenced the decision to replace Banner. The
replacement of Banner is obviously the final stage chronologically speaking,
but this information does seem most appropriate presented here.
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it's be ■ ■
to get smother product. And they used that
activity io determine, to actually move to, stop
using Banner .and to get another product.
The reasons for moving to another system are many, well, I should say, many
reasons were given as to why. Nothing really conclusive emerges from this
research as to why. Two of the more plausible reasons would be cost and the
systems requirements that determined whether upgrading should continue.
The issue of integration also plays a role.
When we look at systems within systems, it is understandable, with regards to
the cost issue, that this was difficult to foretell. The university operates within
the South African system, which operates within the global system. At the time
of purchase, the rand-dollar exchange rate was possibly a concern but
certainly not of the scale that emerged as the meta-systems, South Africa and
the Global economy, began to interact in post 1994 South Africa.
Other issues such as integration and user requirements certainly lend
themselves to discovery and discussion prior to implementation. From the
results of this research, it seems that a pre-impiementation user needs
analysis was not conducted. With regard to integration, the issue was certainly
in the spotlight at the time of the decision for Banner. The question remains as
to how this issue was engaged with and what long-term implications of the
Banner purchase were thought through. What future scenarios did the
university establish that led them to the point of deciding that integration would
not be a problem?
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7.5 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a view of the complexity and size of what I have
called the Wider Banner System. It has shown some of the difficulties that
emerge with regards to a system implementation of this nature. It also shows
the intricate link between 'hard' technical systems and 'soft' people systems.
The chapter concluded with a discussion around the replacement of Banner.
The research from this pilot study shows that there were many potential
reasons for deciding to purchase Banner, but could not conclusively establish
what reasons were used in making that decision.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THEME THREE - TRAINING
8.1 Introduction
This next chapter introduces the readers to some of the events that
surrounded the training of key users for the Banner system.
8.2 Training
The decision has been taken, the implementation completed, the next crucial
stage in the process is the training of users.
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j appropriate training model I
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138
indicates the fear often
associated \-vth computers
and new pi






threatening thing .. •;::'v .
Was the 'need to know
basis' model -the most




but I tel! you, 1 don't know how lo do everything
for IT;
... B u use




whsn. you're ; trained, and ■ Banfter* we were
trained, i, unless other- people maybe nave a
better memory' than ! have, but. uniess 1 actually
.work on it, ! don't remember ho* lo do things.
It wa. . s you
t was
vith a
whole lot of- infdnnaiiCM-i you knew, that! coulcini;
fake in-ail at .one; time..- So for me; it was,'as I
■needed to. know. The first thing, that I'was.faugh!
:ere it








you forget about.it, so ■■with-these; refreshe-r
courses, so to speak, i. think they were j
invaluable actually.
s. As











No ■ ■ ir-
people in how to use
systems on of
technical departments.
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it can you've got' to do -it this way. 3© I. couldn't I
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j computar before, they cJicSift knew -how. to 'switch j
| on;and'then- we had to. introduce■ them to this j
j quite..soptTistiGatetfOrac!e-basedsysterr!j:w!fh a I
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problem,-SQtf.of-tfiirig.-: ■■■■;-,. ^ ■■■.:■.■■ '
That worked. . Eventually- it' was.-just-■-.purely by
repslMon,: Do'lhis do this do ihjs^Some of them
i didn't even explain why they had to do it, its just
one, two, three, four, onei, two, three, four, And it
got through. -. ■ ' ■
Yes and .no .because then obviously its not an
ideal way, ''because, ideally you should 'Siiow
■'hem h>>v it finks in when they e-:« sornetliing on
the student side that'ttey..tnss8 up the Student
fees and. the Financial Aid ''But -my.logic'was
that mainly they don't care: or. they don't think,
they just'want to say registef'astucJent.- They're |
'not really evenihinking how its'going to affect his J
■fees or If theyVe got the wrong.student type he's I
not going to get a.' governmentJoari or. something
tike that, ■ So.-rather just'concentrate .on-'what
they're infe-rested in. In the next ievei up i took
those steps further and sasctjoQlvif this is done
.in that and that way, then -you., couid' have
problems. So the lower level ! kept very low and
tlwi the next level of input staff, it you like, !
explained a bit more and then ■ like the' faculty
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■ " -: ' rid
said about 'this,. v¥€»ll--this, .this- and this has |
happened and this is how you can stop it. And |
then the next fcvei down Asid if the problem I
was reaily the lady at the bottom doing step two j
■■before she^did-step four. Sq;ma^he: swapping j
file steps rourtfl then i said" alright there's been a.
problem- because of this, do not .'one; four, two, j
three. Do it that way. * ■. . ■ ■
Yeai% they are not at that inte!!igence'teve!. 'And j
it's not iniheir jot?■'description^either;; ■■■''■ j
Because.there's no ways I'm.-'going, to lei users j
write. Sequel reports. 'Cause\they 'could've |
dropped tables, its bad enough their? just |
inputting messing up the data, without doing the
reports'to mess it up or using -Sequel language,
'cause that vss the tenguage we used.
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Figure 10: Causal Loop Diagram of Training System
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//? . cfjfefenl1; easier to ask your-GQlleague1 bocauso someiines |
| parac%nis, OsefB ■ and j you would find that, they:..(Banner Office-} would I
1 technical support • staff, ■ say that 'we are-busy andjiist ^go to'your manual I
Cre. .
| ■ communication blocks.'' So you wouicl rather just" gtfto someone :andjiist I
; ' ' I ask you know how do;yoU'Cle::ihis.- SQ:.sojTistirnes |
you felt like you were being, told off if you went to j
••' ' ■ Banner Office,, so its easier to go to a fellow i
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It was so difficult. We're n.ot going to- mentfera \
.narrtesvBut"'later <m when it was" thai guy in
'Maiitzburg, he was so sweet. Ja;. he was on the ]
...ball wtth everything and' it was: a' pleasure then j
but i don't know if the person wasievervorkeci or j
■what but you. avoided going to.... would.bite your |
head off. ■
.Oh we moaned and groaneQ"... There, was. no
higher'being thai wb eoufclspeakte.'--The faculty
id he
couid then But urn it was something we had
to work around that *s why we'd avoid .going to....
and we would rather go to one of our colleagues
if they couid help. Or someone else.
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The .-administrative ■faculty ;admini$tratiori -used it
a lot. ! th ;ou!d
have-but we didn't, have' time to show them what
they/couid'ye-ctone -with- it. But-that1* the- same
with .-any.-system, '■
■Ho, you'see, because if wasn't actually their job
to use it. They (Deans) basically wanted it to get
the information out of the system. So then some
of them asked the facility officers, in. which-case !
then went and. gave them the reports or showed
them, the reports. Of soms'didn't think, you know
that's the crffie?- thing, you've, got in know, 1 think
with ITS we're going to Have to do the same.
We'll get the data input people -educated. Then,
.we goi-ng'fo have to go to-If;enext tevel up to the
.. lat do
you want out of the system, 1 hoy wiii probably
say I don't know and then we will probably have
to say we!! you can get this, this and this, do you
want it? -And then maybe'a couple'-.of-months
!ater, because they're busy _peopte, they wti) say
can I have this or1 maybe that. ■-■■■•.■
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The learning system mapped above provides some insight into the problems
experienced with Banner. The research shows that the training model
implemented was problematic. An event-driven, repetition-based model
seems to have resulted in people having a limited understanding of the full
potential and capability of Banner as a system.
Users were not given a global understanding of Banner. In addition to this,
users were not told of the implications of what their actions in a certain part of
the system would do in other parts of the system. This relates to the issue
discussed in the previous chapter with regards to data integrity.
There seems to have been two major emergent properties from the system
that was operating. The first being the dependency on the Banner Office and
the second being the informal network. Both added to the complexity of the
Banner system.
Both the users and the Banner Office maintained the system of dependency
on the Banner Office, which seemed to be a result of the training offered. The
users colluded in being "happy" with having a crutch and the Banner Office
colluded in supplying that crutch. Not only was the Banner Office supplying
the crutch for the users, it created for itself an extremely powerful position
within the university. This office had a very strong influence on what
information was accessible to the university community. One can assume that
this was not their intention and in fact could assume their intention was to
"help" the users.
The point that is missed is that the Banner Office was responding to an
emergent property of the system created by the training model used. The
Banner Office was reacting to the "fire" of user's requests instead of
investigating the structures underneath to find out why the fires were starting
in the first place.
Without this awareness, the system soon began to reinforce itself and it
simply became "the way we work around here". The Banner Office shifted the
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blame onto the users. This resulted in the mental models of people in the
Banner Office, with regard to users, being reinforced. This further resulted in
the same training being offered in the same way, possibly even further
simplified or not explained. Some evidence of this was recorded above.
An offshoot of this was the informal network. Informal networks are not
uncommon; they are often very positive and play a supporting role in this type
of situation. The problem with this one was that it seemed to emerge as a
result of a non-confrontational learning system that rather adapts and
increases complexity than confront the issue at hand. Users maintained this
system and colluded with each other in keeping it an "open-secret". If a user
did finally get around to going to the Banner Office, the Banner Office would
not have known the journey that this request had taken before it reached
them. From comments by users, it is clear that if the informal network didn't
work, then sometimes the request were dropped altogether and never
reached the Banner Office.
The research shows that perceptions of how well the Banner system worked
were very much dependent on the understanding and ability of faculty officers
to use the system. As they were the key people within the faculty and the only
real users trained, the dean and all other lecturers would need to go through
this person to gain access to the data.
if faculty officers had been trained, or at least gone on training, the
assumption held by her colleagues would be that this person must be able to
use the system. If this was not the case and the person did not know what to
do, a request for non-standard information became a threat. Mode! O-l
learning systems have, as a key characteristic, the desire to protect self and
others from threat and embarrassment (Argyris and Schon, 1978). I would
argue that it is highly probable, under these conditions, to blame the system.
That would either be Banner as a system or the Banner Office.
This goes to show how perceptions of Banner could have arisen within the
university. I would argue that within the system that was operating in the
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university, one of the strongest influencing factors with regard to perceptions
of Banner would have been faculty officers.
As a final comment, ! would turn our attention to the way technology was
actually used within the university. The map presented above of the learning
system clearly illustrates the extent of the complexity of the system. The
attractive and easy option would be to say that the actual "technology" part of
the system is minor and the problem is not technology at all, it is rather some
fairly unrelated "people" issues.
I suggest that this is the option that the university chose to take. But where
does it lead us? It leads to an unrealistic distinction between the technical and
human aspects of an information system. As mentioned before an information
system can only operate within the current workplace system. It is not a
separate entity. If it is going to work well, it must integrate well with how work
is done or the institution must begin to initiate a major change program so that
operating procedures are changed to suit the use of new technology.
I propose that neither happened here. It has already been stated that the area
of change management was a weakness in the implementation process. At
other points within the document it has also been shown that the university
was not going to change its operating procedures either. The result was the
extremely complex Wider Banner System. I would argue that this was an
ineffective use of technology and surely cannot be what the university desired
when the decision was taken to purchase Banner.
8.3 Conclusion
This chapter has presented an overview of the area of training and the
implications thereof with regard to the Banner system. The research has
revealed that there were a number of problematic areas within the training
system, which resulted in the complexity of the Banner system increasing.
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CHAPTER NINE: THEME FOUR - INFORMATION
9.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the reader to the information available to the users of
Banner. The chapter also investigates how Banner was used on a daily basis.
9.2 information
Essentially, the most important element of an information system is the
information that is retrievable from that system. In other words, the type of
information and for whom was that information. We have already looked at
issues of implementation, the Wider Banner System and training. A!! three
areas have had an impact on how information was used and what kind of
information was accessed from the system. We will now look to the
information itself. In an attempt to discover what Banner was used for in
regards to daily operations.
■ :.■■.■ ■ ■'. . . ■ ~ ". '■;;(■ And- then■iHs.\eha!tenge,-.of..course,.; was jne
.- ■ • : ■ r generation of the reports (hat people wanted
. ■...■... :■:■ .: j ''Cause everybody ■ wants■ tons ■ of reports, and
Link between reports j when, they didn't get the reports,, they were
available and 'sysiesn's j saying, what's' happening,: trie system, is not
usefulness. " . " . j workr~c;. Only, in tho inesnttm-3, you needed to
. ■. . [-get somebody to actually write those reports.
[ There were a -whole lot of reports in the system !
is (Ms valid or an untested | that you could generate automatically, and a I
assumption''' whole lot of other reports that had nothing to do I
■ " ::: ', = :'■ ■■ '■■" with the system: jt-:-required ...sorwetsocly/to sit j
'■-■■ ./:; -■.'■■ : ]'■ down-and wile-it out and;sp;we-can'say'th^t'-this'i
' ■■ ■ ; ■'•■' -:■".. j. is what that system wpuicl generate. ^. ■. . : ■
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Wouid this not be linked to
unirn from
S? IS it SO
an
information ■ system
produce reports needed by
the ut
Yes, yes, because the users linked generation of
reports to how good the system was. Not
realising that you need someone to sit down to
try a:
saying-.that the system is not'good..because ws
are not ■getting; the reports ■which .is 'a ridiculous
tiling. If somebody was l!we and w-:r: paid to
generate the reports, then you wouid have got
! the repoiis. So there's a !ot of negative things
that' eaiw'. out' because ■.people ■■didn't get their
| reports or they didn't .get it to .the way they, were
used to. You know, so it's like, it doesn't took like
■■■things .that' I' ussii for the iast fen .years. So there
were a tot of those negative.people, : "■ ■";■■'■ .
¥j ' ■ .vw was
meant to operate.
Why?
Uh, we expected to be able.'to,-.get full' reports on I
airnost anything that %vas, ! mean, it had j
potenliaiiy a. fairly-' frfeo'c% ■:.structured '* qyery
language for getting, ..for' writing reports, for
extracting .infonnatton. So tliat:: one-.wouW; hope I
'thai a .lecturer, rn his office,- -wlio had the !
e to
interrogate the database, ask-for.ai! the-students,
ul\ in his class doing a particular, subject,'or, you
know, whicri of the students., you know, asking
questions like fhat,. That-was certainly' there, the
potential it could be done, but we never did it, it
never got done.
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place? Who controlled the
information flow? . '
'.' vn, who d; ■ ':
d for
■ ■'... ■ le?
Are
I the r .r the
system? 'Technology only'




database, there were a number- of .-standard
reports- lhat-: ■ fcisici tu be written so that' the j
-infofrnatiort- couicl be provided n the-way that |
people expected, exarn • i-esults, registration j
forms,■;and a!! these kinds of tilings,. The initial |
proiect sitnply .had ■'all/'ttiosB-' reports' .-being
generated. With the data-, in/the database, it -was, j
in principle,- given the resourcesy ea.pabi.-e. of j
-■• iHi n rjyrepon /os • i id j
There was a system put-in .place'firstly, to j
'determine if peepe 'really ■ needed--..tile' report, ]
because-you-.know you automatically generate a |
whole lot of reports heseause so-!T!ebociy wanted it j
five years ago 'and-it continues-it>'be generated, j
So that system helped tremendously In reducing j
the number of reports that, was-required. ■■■"That |
■was the first -step. The ■secoiitrstep .was to say, j
let's put some priority on the reports:based, on I
the . acaciernic year, based..- on:. -the ■ semester j
system etc, exarninatioris, period and al! that, j
So that, helped tremendously In cutting down the
number of reports required, But I don't think that
ed a
different group of people---to sit and generate
■reports. They'looked at.the system-.and;.-said it'
was not generating the reports: ' ■
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\ With.no efficient access-to l-Rlght •The information obviously was all there, J
the information, ?:-■ »» vatic!, | It was arable al .5? >v lime. • ■■ ■. |
or u
s all . i
unrealised potential has \ \




narrow, teefa-nic&l focus for
the ,: .






j The gap wai? simply the university. Once the
( project was over, despite of the- fact iiiat we
| lectured the executive very hard, presentations
j to. them, we pointed- out this.' was/only the
{beginning, 'trie project had. been to deliver-a
(■working system and now.:you t'iad'fo provide
| resources. They simply didn't '.provide ' the
j resources. One ended up with ■©ssenfia'iv m one-
l person offic© in. Durban and a one-person office
I in iViariizburc) and they simply wouldn't cope with
j the- workload. So tisy never c>-j anything- -more
i Then basically maintain thetiysteiii../ ..*-.'■ ■. ■■
How was Banner used?
Banner report free. This
was. a Ice.)/' principle .with






j system like this they were general, fciecause one j
{ institution H#arrts a report one v/ay and another I
I wants it different. So the- basic.reperts that we]
j got from Banner were not useiass to us but very I
I general. So then we had, especially being an |
| American System, we nectcfed to write rnafn'c j
reports, and we needed financial .aid according j
| to' our Financial Aid, ' So we just wrote'ai! our j
I own local reports.. ^ I
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["Student admiiifelrato™[-Yeaf\' S suppose-so,.! mean it -can--give-you ]
I information. I everything, ■about a student from tine enquiries j
} phase right through to graduation phase. You I
| can have financial -aid-information,-student fees {
I and residence/ ■ . .. |
j Separate" '.department for j: Management used it a tot for "their ■statistics. In
! management information j fact, ourciepartnieni ofmanageiTientiiiforniation,
from
■ ■ ■ I . ■ ■





administration issues:. ■ :C I"
■'■■ • 'am, the
Bam. . the
way . it up
the s\ ?
I Well yeah, we generated reports like,, "-on© thai I
[ might not seem very '-useful, ':buf was. useful, one [
f of the Catholic fethers in Durban used'to ask us I
| how many Catholic students .-and' names and [
1 addresses of mem We used to, Hilton College |
I-used to ask for names- of ■past-Hilton coitege I
[ boys who'd been accepted .by;'-the-university. }
i Urn, students who coyicini graduate, siude-nis I
| who owed money, we kept details on iike the j
j distance-tearning-stuctents, that sort of thing. As j
I ■ -"""."" ■ -: -".■■. " I
{ well as 'how niuch;. they paid,; ■and, of course, j
[apart from' normal--admirr inforiTiation lite \¥ho's [
j registered for which courses, and who owes I
I money, who's going to graduate, that sort of j
I thing,
■' - ■ - • ' '• ■ --.'••. in it J
| couldrr't do the South African reporting i
J requiresTisnts, so oiwiously we had to create j
! that. That's- . really .-all the- Management I




j on Banner.. System. The-
I Wider . Banner System
to giow in
I j -"-;/;:,?.'/.'> Also .4\:- ■/•:•
| have cost implications for
the'university,' • ■■ :
we had to-create, and'acid on which was a
'disaster and ihatVtosen taking-years, to-reportto
the government for subsidy-purposes and. that.
So :i couldn't do that, I think they had to make
some changes :fo the matrics, I ■don't' think that it
suited 'the' ■university ■ because-: the' •urti¥ersity
doesn't, report the. same way ■ m they do in
America
I Banner said to .be used
i more. for. ; administrative
th
I management information.
I Deals with some technical j
I issues 'of Banner/ Needed j
to a
-
I Indications ■ that a iafge
I amount of the IW/SS
project had to do with
SAPSE,
8 no
reports .at ail .with-this system.' Thai was part of
their policy, that you write your own reports so
- - ■ ■ - ■ -■' :. '. -•' b • ;•■ tried
it on
3 It tQ
do-.government reporting-but It was'lo do-other
reporting that va needed. . "You know,., certain
things' that-weren't in - the system,"-we' actually
added.' on .lik©, ■ certain classifications of the
course and things like thai. So you know we
added quite a lot of things on for reporting
purposes that weren't there 'and also to make' it
possible ito. report 'to the government, you "know
for subsidy reporting.
No, no, no. We had to set up quite a .few
■ databases.. 'Aii right, some' of the information ;
was there. .But sorne was not'there. I mean i
certain classifications that the Government j
needed had..to"be'set up for reporting..'so you j
know they were added on. ■■ ■■■
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■ , . • •' a
I good set of operational
| reports, i take this to mean
[ administrative, 'but a poor
\ set o- .management
| information reports. ■
! Expectation' >'or' system to
i information as well as
on.
ion- !
■ ■•' • ■ \ity. I
, •. ■ ,,-.,,, .. . - <j t0 ]
•■'•■■ to j
I bccummodaie this. Was !
| -•'».'. one: of' the' imde-offs j
for ' "icrc :■■ functionality I
Sys/t i to I
. • '• ■ ■ ■ ■ • jugh j
• • <'--for\
thed:-. nico, fe /?ores
of the
partic the;
mane,i \ \ ±s I
Well Banner came with a goodset of, a. pretty I
■good set--.of &ui]t«in reports for operational
purposes. 'Urn, ■one: ©i Banner's ■sliortcornings j
that it -didn't- coine with a very good' set of j
rnanagerneot reporting tools, Um,.and that's one j
of the things we had to do, was actually build !
something called WflBS onto-thai uni which the
management inforiTiation peoples had to do. So it
delivered operational reports and information but
it didn't' deliver; manageraenf-infonnatfon; And of
course ptimafiiy beirtg,a'Morfh American system,
it didn't deliver information m the SAPSE format.
So ! mean those;are some key.shortcarnirigs of
the system, given' that SAPSE is all-important to
the university. ■
:SAPSE Is. statutory- reporting, ■■ SAPSE.is the
!nformat!j3ff:that has- to be reported in order to
generate the university's subsidy, in that sense j
it's mission-critical, ;.! mean,, if..you get' SAPSE j
wrong, it's the'very basis of'which your 'income.I
from the state is deterrnined. So it's a statutory I
requirement. .'The higher- .level iTianagem.efil |
reporting you know, wasn't wesi developed on !
Banner and" it had to be developed, i think it ]
probably wasn't even fully cieveicpeKJ at the time j
we scrapped. it. You know,, people (ike deans |
and urn, DVCs (Deputy Vice Chanceliors) cjidiil j
have ready -access to the kind' of■information at I
■the ievel they-needed. "■ ■
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of
\ analysis of the information i
| within the database, i
Pro ' 'r:u:>:-iB 'urd* i
! report and one thai was j
: not requested from many
j people, but ■ ■ still very I
I
i . '• - -: • -^d for J
I • ' ' . ■-■ n in\
j decision making imitates j
/ 1 p- ,' in
', ■ ; ' y a- !
1■■ . ■ ■ - can
I !?3i/e in management i
[ support D;d Pra ..system |
1 provide-this'kind-of support I
'■■.'■■-■ ; the\
s, for
example,, that..1'rn..terribly interested in, m that j
would like to .have been'able to. plot.hmr-well
students who get supplementaryexams'do in the
next year;.. .■ And that to rne ■ is very important
academic inforrriatton, I don't "want to,just know
thai this guy- passed Accounts 1 /Accounts 2 and
Accounts 3, okay, I want to know it he got a sup
. and
passed tie..■sup,...bow weli did he.-do so- BIS 3?
That, type of .information is the sort- of ■thing I
■M'jsjld expect from a siuetent record system,
if the
it all.
How do'We-'know? We've 'just decided nov«,
n the
exBcutive that we wiii cany on having
supplementary exams at the University of Natal,,
On what basis? How do.we know-that that's.a
good move? -Okay?; Where'sthe inforwiation to
support that, or are they just saying we are too
t. one
sfiof -only,' and it: you., don't make' it,' repeat
tor this particular request, ;. . .'.'.. j
Banrmr . was seen as\ ' ' ■ j
una ■ j
had to be extracted from j The only time -S-was ever invoked in- tryinp to do I




j There could be a number
i of p •• why
\ this I




i been a mason. •
]'to7took"at success-rates and financial aid.. To do
j that kind of processing, we had to get the
| information out of Banner and into the other
I &tatistics-.system and' put in a lot -of forms for that,.
|'which we really should ■ have done" "in--- Banner.
I She was unable to cio if in' Banner,' What we
I- needed was the success rate 'of /students as a
I-means'of trying to- measure that success rate for
|"the purpose, of--giving fiha'ncia! -aid. -So the
! average suocess rate. So someone performing
I abova er beiow that you wcjuld say yes or no to
I. finaneiai aid.
I Access i,:> -.information
| controlled in'&''hierarchica!
i manner.
I don't know whether Banner could have clone
that
whet!" 3 it, I
don't know. ■ ' ■' ■' ' ' - ' :
e to
I ask for report generation.
| Assumptions- ^ \afoout I
j positions, pavw&r ana j
j respect ■ beginning to J
I surface.
Common , otson j
among p
For ii
to compare ■fTiatric-rnaths -witfi varsity first year I
matis ■ you •know-ttial kind of thing. Those sort I
of reports..w© .couldn't easily' extract ■ those had j
;p. !
■ ""■■-- . ;
mean like .information management had to write j
those reports.
•■--■•■• ; zy ■; ■ ■ i.ne - I
and they would !>_ rtiore dean requestexl. You j
know, they had to be .sort,.of high"" priority |
because ' he (Management.' Informatkjn) is I
.obviously very busy so he wouldn't just run anv j










| system'is much widerthan
the U
- n .'«',., -is an
| administrative devise only.
■ ■ ■■ if r' • : ■
and
I the use of Banner, j
lack
ar
I .it worked.okay, if it was a stariclard -report but if it j
I was sornethsny that they hadn't heard of before, j
j then their first reaction is that it carfl be clone, |
| But ihen-'ihey would sort' of think, about it-and you j
I -know, there was a person there wta would then j
I do it .for us, .So there''was sort of a lot of j
j antagonism at times because we:feft that, you |
I. know,'they were the-only people who-could do- it j
■Land if they couidrrt-elo it, there was no-one else
| to.go to. It'wasrrt iike.iTD, where there was a
I whole Jot of people who you cou'd ask. in fact,
I that was;one of the reasons-thai;they wanted to
j do away with the Banner Office because they felt
i that they, were being-heldhostage by two people.
| Which "wasn't a good thing,
] 1 saw it more as: the administration-the taking of
j the- student rt§lit through- - thaiwas my job here
Gfussng. Banner, Certainly not the-management
I the
students.
From my side, it was an acimfTOirative system.,
but it ateo-'coyid'-giye you the-information, a lot of
inforoiaiicMx Urn, maybe we cJidiT'tiise it to -its full
potential.. We didn't put enough into if, I don't
know, -we only put in what we needed. '
j High. . expectations for j
[ Reports v..'Cf e "identified as I
a problem. Uh, to
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to~7un7eports thai we needed, statistics report
and to produce information in a parts-cuter way
and we ■■also-, expected; it to bo much more
respenswe/ -U.h, 'report-wise, we.had, a little bit of
a balil:: because,■ a; i say, -.at thai particular point
sd to
e that






report: :T!idse 'were the hiccups.
■Again, this'-example.shows '
that inner \
System had a strong ■
.... . i.
■ ' /, > ■ ty of j
iding
to nei -s oi \
Banner.
The (;i\-t>.,(.>■> thai .these \
| examples'beckon is "What j
| exactly . :/s ':ihe ': Banner j
> . ..-.-'■ . ■ :/ fo J
,,-.■_■■ >s ' • '-em, i
I where.: would- ■ ■ you begin \
| and what would tie' yout \
I point of conckision? >:..::, .J
[ AfiGiheruse?'$'perspective \ /-'"■":■■'' •
of ■■■ ■
j Banner was, ; ; ■ ■ ■
| How • -much- does the {
I mental r the\
I person': trained to use a | Yes, 1 think mostly it was to .keep student -records
| .system effect (he way thai t and pass' that- -sort of inforniaiion 'onto the fee
j system-- -is. -use£i- mthin sin j system, you-know. But, um,'I'd.say if was-main!y
j organisation, "he . -mem \ for'day to day'recording of itueterrt, 'you know,
1 trained ■■within ffte|©nquiries,'applications. '' .'; .'/
I university ■;■■ ;. : worn 1
j administrative'' ■ personnel, I ' ' ' -
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Should it be a surprise thai








terms of the old SIMS
system wh&n Banner was
'introduced. Hem we see . •'
again, just diffemni
As I said -jf you had asked me this 12 months
ago - . nts -




flexible and was more user ■friendly, A far better
system.
The research completed for this study has shown that Banner was used
mainly for student administration within the university. In addition to this, most
participants indicated that non-standard reports were difficult to obtain and
depended more on the response of the Banner Office than other factors.
The few examples presented in terms of academic information needed at a
management level indicates that there were difficulties experienced in
obtaining that information. This seems to have occurred for two reasons.
Firstly, deans and heads of schools were not trained to know what Banner
was capable of. Secondly, the way the system operated meant that if you
wanted any information you had to go via faculty officers. This was
problematic and not a very effective use of this kind of technology.
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A key result of this was the increased "control" of information via faculty
officers and the Banner Office. Whether this control was intentional or not is
relatively unimportant. The study shows that these two positions became the
effective gatekeepers of information for the entire university. 1 would argue
that this was an unintended consequence and one that the university must
learn from.
9.3 Conclusion
This chapter has presented an overview of the types of information that was
accessible from Banner and the key role players involved in information
processing on Banner. The research has shown that Banner was used mostly
as a student record system which tracked students from entrance to exit at the
university. In addition, the research has shown that management information
on Banner was difficult to obtain and poorly developed at the time of the




The research carried out in this pilot study has attempted to investigate, from
an organisational learning perspective, the difference between the full
capability and functionality of an information system and the way it was used
in reality within an organisation. This was guided by the statement in the initial
chapter:
From Promise to Practice: Information Systems Implementation
Why the Gap?
In this chapter, I will present the key findings that have emerged as a result of
the research, and outline the key areas of learning that I believe would be
useful for the organisation. Following this, I will conclude this chapter with
some reflections on the methodology used and some suggestions for further
research.
10.2 Key Findings
The key findings of the research can be grouped under the headings of the
themes presented above. These are:
1. Why Banner
2. Wider Banner System
3. Training
4. Information
Conclusions and findings have been made at the end of each section and I
will only briefly summarise these findings to avoid repetition and to present an
overall and concise picture of the findings.
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10.2.1 Why Banner?
The major findings under this theme were related to a lack of information to
support decision making and some inconsistency with regard to an overall
strategy for Banner and, more generally, university technology.
The decision to purchase Banner seemed to be made without the relevant
information. This is with particular reference to the user requirements
specifications. If this was the case and no user needs analysis was done prior
to purchase, then the most obvious question in my mind would be, Why
Banner? What did this system do that fitted the needs of the university and
how was that established when those requirements were not known?
Although some overall strategy for Banner was evident in the research, it was
not implemented. The question of strategy really relates to the above issue of
what the university wanted to achieve through Banner. The quote from one of
the interviewees that keeps ringing in my ears at this stage is " Let me put it
another way, I don't think the university really knew what it wanted, apart from
another system."
10.2.2 Wider Banner System
The Wider Banner System had a number of components to it. These were the
project management of the implementation, the Banner Office and finally, the
reasons for a new system. The findings will be presented under these
headings.
10.2.2.1 Project Management
The key findings for project management were firstly, that the implementation
was very focused and was driven by time and budget and secondly, that there
was not enough emphasis placed on the management of change within the
project.
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The implementation was done on time and within budget, and considering the
complexity that has been uncovered even by this pilot research study, this is
extremely commendable.
However, some concerns about "bulldozing" the implementation were
recorded. One of the dangers that lurk about when a project is so focused and
has pre-defined deadlines and budgets and no flexibility is that you can
disregard the systemic nature of a project and its boundaries. These issues
often only become evident once the project is in 'motion'.
The problem that one is then confronted by when this type of rigidity occurs is
maintaining relevance. Is the project still relevant within the dynamic and ever
changing environment in which it was first implemented? Is the environment
still the same? Are there any new areas of concern that need to be addressed
that were not identified at the beginning of the project? (Kriener, 1995, 1996).
This may have been the case with the Banner project. The research
completed does not give any concise findings in this matter. Concerns were
raised but the research was not on a scale that I am able to confidently state
that this happened or that the concerns were of a far reaching consequence.
The lack of change management seems to have been a weakness within the
process. The only technique discovered to facilitate change was
communication, training and workshops. As pointed out in the relevant
chapter, no use of any change management process was evident, although
certain aspects seemed to avail themselves to the Banner Implementation
Team, such as the "burning platform" of the crumbling technology.
10.2.2.2 Banner Office
The key areas of concern under this heading were, the system of dependency
that developed, lack of data integrity, identity issues related to the Banner
Office and resource allocation.
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The system that was implemented created a large degree of dependency on
the Banner Office. Users were forced to rely on the Banner Office for the
generation of reports. Even when this was not necessary, evidence was
shown that users would rather use the Banner Office than generate the report
themselves. The research also showed that both the people in the Banner
Office and the users colluded to maintain this system.
Due to the dependency on the Banner Office, a user would often submit the
request for a report and assume that what was in the report they received was
the information they asked for. As such data integrity became an issue.
Issues relating to identity and the naming of the Banner Office were dealt with
in some detail in the relevant chapter. The main focus of this discussion was
identity with a particular product and not a particular role or function. I argued
that this could have had some influence on perceptions of the new system
and created some defensiveness when a critical review of Banner was
needed to see whether the system was providing the university with what it
wanted.
The final issue with regards to the Banner Office was that it was under-
resourced. It was shown in the research that the Banner Office was not
staffed in the manner originally suggested and that generally the post-
implementation stage of the project was under-resourced.
10.2.2.3 Reasons for a New System
The key areas under this heading are cost, results of the user needs analysis
and integration.
Most participants stated that cost and the rand / dollar exchange rate were the
fundamental reasons for needing a new system. This area would have been
difficult to predetermine at the point of purchase, 1993, and involves much
larger systems such as the interaction of national economies.
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The research states that a user needs analysis was conducted in the post-
implementation stage and the information from this analysis was used as
support for the decision not to continue with Banner upgrades. As mentioned
in a number of places throughout this document, this kind of user needs
analysis is essential to a systems implementation and should have been done
prior to purchase.
The final reason uncovered by this study was the issue of integration. The
university was operating with a number of systems that did not communicate
with each other and hence difficulty was experienced when trying to interface
between the systems. The research indicates that Banner was decided upon
without much reflection into the implications of this system for the wider
university computing system.
10.2.3 Training
The training model implemented was particularly problematic. It was an event-
driven, repetition-based model that produced a number of unexpected
outcomes.
A major problem with the training system was that it never produced a group
of core, power users that had a good global view of the full functionality of the
system and what it could do. People were shown what to do for certain events
that were rapidly approaching in the university's calendar. It was shown that
this was sometimes done without even explaining to the trainees why they are
doing it. The training seemed to be a very technical 'step-by-step1 process that
failed to create any depth of understanding in terms of potential for use among
the users. This again adding to the system of dependency that was created in
the way the system was implemented.
Another unexpected development was the strong informal network that
developed within the system. I would argue that this was mainly a result of a
non-confrontational learning system (Model O - I Learning System, Argyris
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and Schon, 1978) whereby people created another level of complexity within
this system rather than confront the issue at hand.
As a final observation in terms of the training aspect of the implementation
process, I would suggest that the strongest influence on the perceptions of
Banner's usefulness within the university were faculty officers. How well these
people could use the system and how much of a grasp of what the system
could do for the university these people had, had a strong influence as to
whether Banner was perceived in a positive or negative manner. This is
directly related to the training of users.
10.2.4 Information
What emerged from the research was that the system was used more for
administrative purposes than other functions. Access to useful management
information was inherently problematic within this system. In fact, the
complexity of the system grew again with the development of MIBS to cope
with this type of reporting.
A guiding principle within the Banner system is that of being relatively report
free. This is due to the different requirements of each university for reporting.
In principle, I can see the benefit of this, but this needs to be matched with the
requisite resources to make use of the inherent potential within the system.
A common comment from participants was that all the information was there,
it just wasn't used. I raised the question at that point in regards to the value of
unrealised potential. If the technology is capable of something, but the system
as a whole is not operating effectively then is it fair, or even useful, to say that
the potential is there. It would seem to be more of a blame shifting strategy
than a useful suggestion.
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10.3 Overall Findings
Two other areas of importance have been shown through the research. The
first is the complexity of the system and the second is the question of what
exactly the Banner system was.
When I began to map out the extent of the overall system, I was amazed at
the complexity that I saw. What amazed me even more was that this
complexity existed in an environment where technology had been
implemented in an attempt, one would hope, to bring about a greater degree
of efficiency and effectiveness with regard to workplace procedures and
operating practices.
I have attempted to show this complexity visually with the rich picture
presented below. It shows a total of six systems operating within the one
larger system and I have also attempted to show how these systems interact
with one another. Although sometimes it is the case that the systems have
developed very much so that they do not have to interact, and that is also
shown. See Figure 12 on the next page.
The other area mentioned leads on from the discussion above and is
concerned with what exactly the Banner system was. I think the results have
shown that to think of it purely in terms of the technology implemented would
be to dismiss aspects of the system that have had a vital and powerful impact
on the Wider Banner System.
As mentioned before, I would argue that this is the route the university took. It























































































































This issue really revolves around wider and more generic issue of the role of,
what I would call, workplace operating systems and information systems. As
mentioned earlier, an information system must fit the current workplace
operating systems or the organisation must change so that workplace
operating systems match the new technology. But this is not a simple, clearly
defined situation. It is more of a messy, dynamic and intensely complex
situation that requires a great deal of thought and investigation.
The case study used in this research shows what I believe to be a poor use of
technology and indicates a lack of intensive investigation into the issue we are
discussing. This point begins to touch on the importance of boundary
definition in an implementation such as this.
10.4 Learning from the Banner Implementation
10.4.1 Decision support systems
The decision to purchase Banner was problematic. The research indicates
that the decision-making context was pressurised and the decision to
purchase Banner was based on insufficient information.
I suggest, therefore, that the university needs to develop some appropriate
decision support systems to aid decision making within this context. The
decision-making context is not unique, what therefore, needs to be addressed
are the systems that can support and inform decision-making. As a point of
clarification, I would like to state that when I talk about decision support
systems, I am talking about support for decision making in a systemic sense.
The term 'decision support systems' has a very specific meaning within the
field of information systems and thus the above point of clarity is needed.
10.4.2 The role of technology within the university
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The research indicates that at the time of the Banner implementation, a clear
information technology / information systems strategy did not exist within the
University. With regards to organisational learning and the role of technology,
I suggest that a policy or strategy of this nature be developed.
This point is made with reference to the brief overview of the information
systems literature. The majority of which recommends that this type of
information systems strategy be used as the guiding policy for all information
technology interventions within the organisation.
The research showed that the issue of what information and for whom was
this information was not clearly thought through. An information systems
policy would serve as the point of departure for such an investigation.
The other more obvious learning point for the university is associated with
systems implementation and the systems development life cycle. For any
future information systems implementations, the university should conduct a
user needs analysis prior to purchase. The university should use this
information as the basis for deciding which system will best suit their needs.
10.4.3 A systems approach to understanding the context of the
university
The research clearly indicated that the system developed to maintain the
Banner technology was complex and involved a number of different systems.
As such, I would recommend that a systems approach, possibly utilising
Checkland's (1981) Soft Systems Methodology (SSM), be used towards a
more systemic understanding of the university context. One of the reasons
Checkland (1981) developed SSM was to investigate complexity in what he
termed soft systems. From this brief pilot investigation, the university
environment presents itself as a system of great complexity and, I would
argue, a system that Checkland would classify as a soft system. Checkland's
SSM emphasises the importance of stakeholder participation and interaction
patters between stakeholders within the system. The CATWOE tool is an
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indication of this. I would also argue that the SSM method of inquiry would be
very well suited to the university environment.
Mapping the context systemically would help the organisation discover some
of the less obvious systems, such as the informal training system that
developed within the Wider Banner System, currently operating. The
university could benefit from such an understanding in that it may reveal the
non-obvious points of intervention within the university system and allow for
the development of an intervention that would take into account the causal
nature of the system.
With particular reference to a systems implementation, a systemic
understanding of the context would be beneficial with regards to the
development of an information systems strategy. I suggest that this type of
information may provide insight into the broader discussion of the role of
technology within the university. A systemic understanding of the university
context would help bring about a greater understanding of the interaction of
both the human and technical systems operating and may lead to a more
effective use of technology within the complexity of these interacting systems.
10.4.4 The learning systems operating within the university
Indications from the research show that the university is currently operating
within a Model 0 - I limited learning system (Argyris & Schon, 1978). I
therefore propose that an investigation into the learning systems operating
within the university would be beneficial. Argyris and Schon (1978) claim that
the Model 0 -1 learning system is not only limiting, but also is difficult for the
organisation to discover due to the camouflage aspect discussed earlier.
An investigation of this nature would allow the university to begin to recognise
some of the limiting features of the Model 0 - I system and may help the
university to move towards becoming more of a learning organisation.
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10.4.5 Managing change
One of the major findings from the research was the lack of change
management. In a systems implementation, the change aspect of the project
is vital and has a strong influence on the overall success of the project.
For any future university-wide interventions, the university needs to place a
greater emphasis on the change process. It needs to be carefully managed
and monitored as the project progresses. Drawing from Dawson (1994), the
university should be sensitive to the dynamic nature of change and learn how
to manage a process of change that has the potential to change as each step
of the process is implemented.
10.5 Reflections on Methodology
I found the learning history methodology to be a very interesting and useful
way of investigating the problem context. It was the first time that I had
conducted research of this scale using a systems methodology and I found it
both rewarding and challenging.
I found that the learning history methodology lent itself very well to the
analysis of the interview transcripts. I had taken a weeks leave to immerse
myself in the analysis of the data. At the beginning of the week I felt daunted
and overwhelmed with the amount of "stuff' that I had in terms of raw data.
I was very concerned whether the data was going to pull together to make a
coherent whole and, at the beginning of the week, I certainly couldn't see
myself telling a useful story of any sort from my pile of "stuff. This is why I say
that the learning history methodology was challenging. It forced me to trust in
the concept of emergence.
The guidelines presented by Kleiner and Roth (1996) where very helpful.
These guidelines provided the scaffolding I needed to draw out themes from
amongst the data. I really enjoyed this process. The coding of the data,
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sorting of the codes and finally the use of the grouping exercise to consolidate
the theme topics was useful. It was interesting to see how the themes began
to reveal themselves from the data, well at least that is how it felt.
Once I had the themes, the process was very straightforward. It was
enjoyable taking the quotes of participants and stringing them together into a
meaningful story.
The difficulty I found with creating the stories was trying to be as truthful to the
data as possible. The themes presented are my perception of the story, told in
the voice of those involved at the time. This is where I would find the learning
history team very useful. It would be a place to sound ideas and challenge
perspectives prior to the document being written.
I learnt a great deal through the research process, i like the idea of a jointly-
told tale and of story telling as a means of presenting an organisational
document. The format is very accessible which could lead to more people
reading the document, and more importantly, ! believe that a learning history
has the potential to become a powerful tool for organisational learning.
10.6 Recommendations for Further Research
As the introduction to this document reads, this research was a pilot study.
The research has revealed a number of areas of interest for further study for
the institution concerned and on a more generic level.
These areas are:
1) The relationship between workplace operating systems and new
technology.
2) Decision making within higher education institutions.
3) The role of information technology and information systems in decision
support and management support.
4) The role technology has to play in streamlining workplace procedures.
176
5) Change management processes within larger project-based
implementations,
I believe that these areas of research would be of value to the organisation
studied and to a much wider audience. It would also add some value to the
field of information technology on a more general level.
10.7 Conclusion
This study has attempted to investigate organisational learning at the
University of Natal, Durban campus. It has used the Banner student
information systems implementation as the case study. The learning history
methodology used within the research process was a useful tool that allowed
the research findings to be presented in a meaningful and accessible manner.
The research was limited by time and resources to a pilot study and has shed
some light on different aspects that the university can learn from.
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